Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of Litigation, Deals, and Diversity by Alfieri, Anthony V.
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles Faculty and Deans
2011
Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of
Litigation, Deals, and Diversity
Anthony V. Alfieri
University of Miami School of Law, aalfieri@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony V. Alfieri, Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of Litigation, Deals, and Diversity, 24 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 991 (2011).
Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of
Litigation, Deals, and Diversity
ANTHONY V. ALFIERI*
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores new research directions in the study of large law firm risk
governance norms and practices. The purpose of this ongoing study is to assess
the impact of governance norms and practices on individual and institutional
decision-making under contemporary models of large law firm economics in the
fields of litigation, deal transactions, and workplace employment, including
hiring, promotion, and retention.' The nationwide economic downturn that
frames this inquiry weighs heavily on traditional models of large law firm
economics. Historically significant, the downturn exacerbated structural tensions
2 3and ratcheted up institutional pressures on partners, associates, and the
workplace as a whole.4 Experienced on both local and global scales, these
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1. I use the term "risk governance" instead of the more conventional "risk management" to convey a deeper,
more intrinsic normative purpose and value, rather than a narrowly instrumental, utilitarian function.
2. See THoMAs D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERIcAN LAWYER 1-17 (2010); Leigh Jones, Vanishing Act:
Year II, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 8, 2010, at 54 (describing 2009-2010 declines in partner and associate ranks of the
nation's 250 largest law firms as "the biggest two-year decline in the 33-year history of the [NLJ] survey").
3. See Vanessa O'Connell & Nathan Koppel, Law Finns Hold Line in Setting Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27,
2010, at Bl.
4. See Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2051,2051 (2010);
David B. Wilkins, Team ofRivals? Towarda New Model ofthe CorporateAttomey-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2067, 2070-72 (2010); HIDEBRANrr BAKER RoBeNs & Cm PRIvAE BANK, THE 2011 CuEwr ADvIsORY 2-5
(2011), available at http://hildebrandt.staged.hubbardone.com/Hubbard.webParts/Corelabc.aspxurl=http%3A//
hildebrandt.staged.hubbardone.com/201 lClientAdvisory; HILDEBRANDT BAKER RoaBINs & Cm PRIVATE BANK,
THE 2010 CLIENT ADvIsORY 2 (2010), available at http://www.hbrconsulting.com/Hubbard.FileSystem/files/
Publication/bf6e65cl-blle-42b2-811c-05e7d728e9c7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1f0cl222-7572-
4bfd-aea4-08601bd6e66d/2010_ClientAdvisory.pdf.
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tensions and pressures shape the day-to-day judgments of lawyers in corporate
boardrooms, federal and state courtrooms, and law firm suites. Together, they
mold risk-averse and risk-taking behavior in the lawyering process and in law
firm management.
In a prior work, I argued that the widespread adoption of risk management
mechanisms-compliance procedures, internal controls, and reporting require-
ments-by law firms diminished a full appreciation of the difficult moral choices
faced by lawyers in modern practice throughout litigation and transactional fields
of representation. Albeit functionally useful, these organizational mechanisms, I
argued, diluted the deep-rooted, other-regarding obligations of lawyers in society
across public and private spheres of service.5 Drawing on the work of legal ethics
scholars Milton Regan and William Simon,6 I maintained that the technology of
risk assessment and regulation gleaned from the adjacent professional arenas of
commerce, insurance, and corporate industry discounted the daily need for the
exercise of moral discretion and the daily calling of a higher public obligation.
As a result, I asserted, lawyers and law firms together underestimated the burdens
of individual moral agency in the requisite discretionary decisions that are part
and parcel of everyday legal advocacy.8 No less important, I added, the same
lawyers and law firms routinely neglected their well-settled individual and
collective duties of social responsibility to clients, third parties, and the public,
and thus discarded the highest ambitions of professionalism in American law.9
Prominent among those ambitions are the responsibilities to ensure equal
opportunity, diversity, and equity in the workplace."o
In revisiting my previous inquiry, this Article seeks not only to integrate the
ideas of diversity and risk governance in law firm employment and workplace
inclusion and exclusion, but also to test the "moral diminution" thesis sketched
above against a competing "collaborative" thesis put forward by the respected
5. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909,
1910 (2006) [hereinafter Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics].
6. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004); WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICs (1998) [hereinafter SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE].
7. See Alfieri, The Fall ofLegal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1910-11.
8. Id. at 1911; see also Stephan Landsman, The Risk of Risk Management, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2315,
2326-27 (2010) (predicting a risk management-fueled law firm "retreat to simplistic self-protective solutions"
that is both "misleading and dangerous").
9. Landsman, supra note 8, at 2326-27. Historically, the highest ambitions of professionalism in American
law and ethics typically comport with traditions of independence, service, and trust. See generally Robert W.
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. I (1988); Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather, Pro Bono,
the Public Good, and the Legal Profession, in PRIvATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST. THE EvOLVING ROLE
OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1-19 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009).
10. See Deborah Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, 24 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041 (2011) [hereinafter Rhode, Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms].
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practitioner and law firm consultant Anthony Davis." Contrary to my initial
hypothesis that risk management detrimentally conflates professional ethics and
identity with economic self-interest, Davis insists that risk management benefi-
cially educates lawyers in ethics, enhances their decision-making, and elevates
their individual behavior through institutional culture and oversight.12 To
evaluate Davis's risk management thesis and to extend its reach to law firm
employment and workplace governance more generally, the instant Article
revisits the case of John Gellene, a former partner at the Wall Street law firm of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (Milbank), prosecuted for transactional and
litigation misconduct in United States v. Gellene," and also examines the recent
high profile employment discrimination suit in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP,14 and the widely reported and
protracted discovery sanction controversy in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom
Corp." Each of these cases illustrates the individual and institutional exercise of
risk governance norms and practices in discrete litigation, transactional, and
employment settings. Applied in the context of' the large law firm legal services
industry, this multi-pronged inquiry will help chart new directions for risk
governance research on the legal profession.
New directions in law firm organizational ethics research include studies of
both "commercialism" and "managerialism." 6 This Article mainly addresses the
disquieting rise of risk-calibrated managerialism among law firms, here marked
by "their tendency to fragment legal work into specialist and technical areas, and
to create hierarchical arrangements" that "can degrade individual lawyers' sense
of professional autonomy and their capacity to take responsibility for their own
work."17 That growing degradation signals an industry-wide failure to integrate
institutional risk management systems and the broader ethical traditions of the
profession in everyday practice. Daily evidence of such failed integration in
litigation, transactional, and workplace contexts demonstrates not only that "risk
prevention only gets you so far," 8 but also that risk prevention may diminish the
exercise of professional autonomy and responsibility.
11. See Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of Lawyer
Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL Ermcs 95, 96 (2008) [hereinafter Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management].
12. See id. at 113-24.
13. United States v. Gellene, 24 F. Supp. 2d 922 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
14. EEOC v. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 0655 (LTS), 2011 WL 280804 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20,
2011).
15. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm III), No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL66932 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 7, 2008), vacated in part, 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008).
16. See Christine Parker & Lyn Aitken, The Queensland "Workplace Culture Check": Learning from
Reflection on Ethics Inside Law Firms, 24 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 399, 402-03 (2011).
17. Id. at 403 ("Managerialism can 'deprofessionalize' legal work and colonize the space in which lawyers
might otherwise have been trusted to act in contextually appropriate ways using professional judgment and
values.").
18. E-mail from Deborah Rhode to author (May 2,2011,7:22 PST) (on file with author).
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Consider Davis's vision of ethics and professionalism in this troubling light.
Driven by the profit and productivity imperatives of law firm economic
self-interest, Davis's management axioms and norms offer a vision of lawyer
professionalism limited in moral aspiration and narrow in social function. At
best, his espoused norms promote technical rule calibrations to minimize
risk-taking behavior harmful to lawyer or law firm prosperity. Davis defines harm
expressly in terms of adverse impact on institutional profitability, fastening risk
incentives to individual and collective self-interest. 19 His prescribed environment
of centralized authority and leadership supplies an efficient, albeit overly
segmented and structured, mechanism to foster self-interested compliance, a
mechanism that effectively undermines independent ethical protest and resolve.2 0
Resolution of ethical issues in this environment too often hinges on judgments of
individual and firm advantage framed by the tournament, "eat what you kill"
culture of the large law firm legal services industry. Such self-regarding
judgments consider the reactions instead of the interests of law, integrity, or
community.
Despite these deficiencies, risk management systems serve a useful risk-
checking and compliance-reinforcing function in the governance of large,
bureaucratic institutions. While necessary, the systems are not sufficient for
ethical governance in transactional representation and negotiation, litigation
advocacy, or workplace employment. Adequate governance requires regulatory
systems that cultivate a lawyer's independent moral judgment and individual
social responsibility, celebrate classical values of law and diverse community,
and pronounce higher aspirations of professional and public leadership.2 '
Standing alone, ethics rules furnish formal, procedural methodologies tailored to
private client and professional lawyer interests but afford little substantive
guidance for lawyer moral discretion in the pursuit of legality and justice in
litigation, transactions, or workplace equity. Deeper integration of the moral and
public precepts of the profession into the prescribed risk-based routines of
expanding industry-wide managerial systems returns to lawyers and law firms the
important opportunity to fulfill the obligations of moral agency, to discharge the
duties of social responsibility, and to meet the higher ambitions of professional
independence, service, and trust.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the nature and regulation of
risk in law firm management and corporate governance. Part II examines Davis's
attempted integration of risk management precepts and legal ethics rules in light
of David Luban's recent work on risk deniability and integrity in the legal
19. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 99-100.
20. See id. at 100.
21. See Alfieri, The Fall ofLegal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1949-5 1.
994 [Vol. 24:991
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profession.2 2 Part III extends Luban's notion of risk deniability to the context of
the Gellene, Kelley Drye, and Qualcomm case studies, parsing out the concepts of
discrimination, transactional, and litigation risk in law firm practice. Part IV
deduces an alternative set of risk governance ethics from classical, discretionary,
regulatory, and diversity norms of the profession in an effort to enhance lawyer
integrity and to expand equal opportunity and equitable treatment in the large
firm legal services industry. Turn first to the literature of risk management and
governance in the legal services industry.
I. RISK IN LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE
The literature of risk,23 risk management,24 and risk governance2 5 is wide
ranging, encompassing finance,26 the airline and hospital industries,27 insur-
ance,2 8 science, 29 and more. In law and related socio-legal studies, 30 the literature
addresses corporate governance, criminal justice,3 2 arbitration and litigation
22. See generally DAVID LuBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007); Anthony V. Alfieri,.Jim Crow
Ethics and the Defense of the Jena Six, 94 IowA L. REv. 1651, 1689-99 (2009) [hereinafter Alfieri, Jim Crow
Ethics].
23. See JoHN ADAMs, RISK (1995); JAKOB ARNOLDI, RISK (2009); ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A
NEW MODERNITY (1992); ULRICH BECK, WORLD RISK SoCIErY (1999); Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon,
Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 1-25 (2002)
[hereinafter EMBRACING RISK]; Ulrich Beck, World at Risk: Thd New Task of Critical Theory, 37 DEv. & Soc'Y 1
(2008).
24. See generally ANTHONY E. DAvis & PETER R. JARVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT' SuRvivAL TOOLS FOR LAW
FIRMS (2d ed. 2007); Anthony E. Davis, The Long-Term Implications of the Kaye Scholer Case for Law Firm
Management-Risk Management Comes ofAge, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 677 (1994).
25. See ORTWIN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN A COMPLEX WORLD 8-11 (2008).
26. See JAMES T. GLEASON, RISK: THE NEW MANAGEMENT IMPERATIVE IN FINANCE (2000);. Douglas 0.
Edwards, An Unfortunate "Tail": Reconsidering Risk Management Incentives After the Financial Crisis of
2007-2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REv. 247 (2010).
27. See Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks into the
Health-Insurance Pool with an Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 79
(2010); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEo. L.J. 1 (2008);
Anthony Kearns, Risky Business: When It Comes to Managing Errors, Law Firms Could Learn Some Lessons
from Airlines and Hospitals, AM. LAW, Sept. 1, 2010, at 49.
28. See Jonathan Simon, Edgework and Insurance in Risk Societies: Some Notes on Victorian Lawyers and
Mountaineers, in EDGEWORK: THE SOCIOLOGY OF RISK-TAKING 203-26 (2005). See generally EMBRACING RISK,
supra note 23.
29. See Marc R. Poirier, "It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times ... :" Science, Rhetoric and
Distribution in a Risky. World, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 409 (2002); Dayna Nadine Scott, Confronting Chronic
Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis ofRisk and Precaution, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 293 (2008).
30. See Jonathan Simon, Risk and Reflexivity: What Socio-Legal Studies Add to the Study of Risk and the
Law, 57 ALA. L. REv. 119 (2005).
31. See Tom Baker, Embracing Risk, Sharing Responsibility, 56 DRAKE L. REv. 561 (2008); Tom Baker &
David Moss, Government as Risk Manager, in NEw PERSPECTrIVES ON REGULATION 87-109 (David Moss & John
Cisternino eds., 2009).
32. See Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment in Criminal
Justice, 1 ANN. REv. LAW & Soc. Scl. 397 (2005).
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risk, 3 deal or transactional risk,34 and risk allocation in global practice.s Well
honed in matters of institutional control and regulation, this burgeoning literature
emphasizes structural management practices, rather than nonstructural, "deep
governance" norms, 3 6 such as the commitment to diversity, equal opportunity,
and workplace equity. To begin, consider the basic form and content of risk
management practices.
A. RISK MANAGEMENT
Like many in the field of risk management, Davis treats risk as a neutral
concept tied to probability and economic loss. 3 7 He defines "risk" to mean "any
danger that, if not controlled, may lead to consequences unintended by and
harmful to a law firm or lawyer."38 From this definition, risk management refers
to "the establishment of institutional (i.e., firm or practice-wide) policies,
procedures, or systems .. . designed to minimize risk within the firm and its
practice." 3 9 At the same time, risk management refers to a firm "culture that
promotes both awareness of the kinds of risks that the firm's practice necessarily
entails and actively supports compliance with the policies and procedures that the
firm has adopted." 4 0
On this calculus, Davis links structural governance variables and nonstruc-
tural, deep governance variables to norms of profit and efficiency. Both sets of
management variables operate to identify, assess, and order risk.4 1 Because this
order of operation combines economic self-interest with risk calculation and
33. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 CoLUM. L. REv.
1479 (2001); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational
Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REv. 923 (2004); Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83
OR. L. REv. 861 (2004); Joan T.A. Gabel, The Peculiar Moral Hazard of Employment Practices Liability
Insurance: Realignment of the Incentive to Transfer Risk with the Incentive to Prevent Discrimination, 20
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. PoL'Y 639 (2006).
34. See Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees, 63
VAND. L. REv. 1161, 1163 n.1 (2010); Robert T. Miller, The Economics ofDeal Risk: Allocating Risk Through
MAC Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2007, 2015-34 (2009).
35. See Anthony E. Davis, New Age, Old Rules: An Outdated Regulatory Framework Puts U.S. Firms at a
Competitive Disadvantage on the Global Stage, Am. LAW., Oct. 1, 2010, at 65-66.
36. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors' and
Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEo. L.J. 1795, 1820, 1837 (2007) [hereinafter Baker & Griffith, The Missing
Monitor in Corporate Governance].
37. On neutrality in risk discourse, see DEBORAH LUPTON, RISK 8 (1999).
38. See Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 98 (citing DAvIs & JARvIS, supra note
24, at 3); see also id. at 98-99 (claiming definitional extension that goes "far beyond the risk of malpractice
claims, and includes criminal prosecution (of individual lawyers and law firms collectively), professional
discipline, claims for disgorgement of fees, malicious prosecution, sanctions, and other allegations of wrongful
conduct in the course of law practice, and even law firm dissolution").
39. Id. at 99 (citing DAvis & JARVIs, supra note 24, at 4).
40. Id.
41. See Stephen Crook, Ordering Risks, in RISK AND SocIocuLrURAL THEORY" NEw DIRECTONS AND
PERSPECTIVEs 160, 161-75 (Deborah Lupton ed., 1999).
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ethical deliberation, Davis contends that risk management boosts individual
ethical deliberation within large law firms.4 2 In fact, he argues that risk
management institutionalizes ethical values and gives them concrete technical
form.43 Indeed, he discerns a complementary relationship between the goals and
the mechanics of risk management and the principles of legal ethics and
professionalism." Under this collaborative view, risk management educates
lawyers in ethics, supports their decision-making, and reinforces their individual
behavior through institutional culture and oversight. 5 In this sense, risk
management presents a moral opportunity to model, prevent, and correct
conduct. 46
Risk management norms and practices flow from internal institutional sources
and external rule-based systems. Davis describes the relationship between
internal risk management structures and external legal ethics systems in terms of
"two symbiotically related fields of thought and endeavor."47 He denies that law
firm risk management "somehow undermines individual lawyers' responsibility
to act ethically," or that the "increased use of risk management will cause
individual lawyers' capacity for ethical deliberation to atrophy."4 8 Rather, he
attempts "to show that risk management enhances individual ethical delibera-
tion," giving "concrete form" to and "institutionalizing" the values of legal
professionalism. 49 In point of fact, he posits a "[complementary] relationship
between the goals and the mechanics of risk management . .. and the principles
of legal ethics and professionalism," a relationship that he claims defies "either
bureaucratic regimentation or unfettered individual lawyer discretion."5  In his
view, risk management affords a "collaborative" model "in which law firms
institutionally and lawyers individually interact in order to arrive at ethical
decisions."5' Thus, collaboratively fashioned, "risk management educates,
supports, and reinforces ethical decision making on both the institutional and the
individual levels" of the lawyering process. 52
42. See Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 95-96.
43. See id. at 96.
44. See id. at 113-24.
45. See id. at 96.
46. On moral opportunity and risk, see Jonathan Simon, Risking Rescue: High Altitude Rescue as Moral Risk
and Moral Opportunity, in RISK AND MoRALYTY 375-406 (2003).
47. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 95.
48. Id. at 96.
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis in original).
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis in original).
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The rationale for risk management, Davis explains, stems from the institu-
tional desire to "improve the quality" of client services, "achieve greater
profitability," "enhance[] access to the professional liability insurance market,"5 3
and help "identify and manage risks which, if not addressed, present the threat of
significant adverse consequences."54 Such consequences, as here, may entail the
disgorgement of attorneys' fees, discovery sanctions, and federal discrimination
charges. Davis's appointed objectives attach "positive incentives" to "individual
and collective self-interest," correlated "to the greatest extent possible" to
"improve efficiency and profitability."55 Davis attributes the failure to meet these
objectives-for'example, in the narrow context of client intake selection and
conflicts of interest clearance-to "the absence of effective and appropriately
supported risk management systems within the firm at large."5 6 Under this logic,
the "real culprit" in errant ethical conduct lies with the firm or system, not the
individual, in spite of the rogue lawyer conduct in the Gellene case.
Consequently, and not unreasonably, "firms that fail to consider either the
adequacy of their client intake management infrastructure or the adequacy of the
firm's culture in supporting and encouraging compliance. . . unquestionably
increase the likelihood" of recurrent individual or institutional misconduct.58
To Davis, the ideal system for effective risk management identifies "risk
management categories," enumerates existing "procedures or systems," and
develops "strategies to control risk categories." 5 9 The conduct at issue here-
concurrent representation, discovery disclosure, and partner compensation-all
signify risk categories. Comprehensive law firm risk management systems, Davis
insists, "demonstrate the pervasive relationship between risk management and
legal ethics" by building and operating a "segmented and structured" environ-
ment of authority and leadership,60 consistent with supervisor-subordinate
hierarchy and partner-associate leverage central to law firm design. To exert
authority, he observes, law firm "management must have sufficient authority
delegated by all partners to be able to control the practice of all the individual
53. On the role of the professional liability insurance market in lawyer regulation, see David Barnhizer,
Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business ofLaw Practice
for Profit, 17 GEo. J. LEGAL Emcs 203 (2004); George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss
Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CoNN. INs. L.J. 305 (1997).
54. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 99.
55. Id. at 100. Davis cites professional liability insurance rates as an additional consideration. Id. ("The
availability of coverage, the size of deductibles, the limits available, the terms of coverage, and the price of
malpractice insurance are more and more dependent on law firms' ability to demonstrate to underwriters that
they have adopted and institutionalized appropriate risk management systems.").
56. Id.
57. Id. at 100, 102-03.
58. Id. at 100 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 102-03.
60. Id. at 103.
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members of the firm without exception (and regardless of seniority)." 61 For the
purposes of leadership, he remarks, firm management "must actively, continu-
ously, and consistently communicate to all the firm's personnel its commitment to
implement risk management throughout the firm."6 2 That duty of communication
applies equally to the corporate boardroom, trial courtroom, and law firm
workplace.
In accordance with the hierarchical segmentation of law firm authority and
leadership, Davis assigns risk management functions to law firm general counsel
or to a risk management committee to carry out "the day-to-day functions of
managing the practice to reduce risk." 6 3 The assignment of practice and human
resource management functions by law firms to a centralized authority or
leadership group, he notes, "ensure[s] the quality of their individual lawyers'
services" and checks the potential misconduct of "individual lawyers or tightly
knit groups of lawyers."" Implementation of this checking or prevention
function, he stresses, requires appropriate firm procedures and forms, clear
instructions, and policies under the supervision of general counsel and the
auspices of a firm-wide culture of compliance.65 Supervision entails the
"development, promulgation, and uniform enforcement of appropriate risk
management policies, procedures, and systems throughout the law firm."66
Compliance expands lawyer loyalty obligations beyond individual superiors to
encompass clients, colleagues, and the firm as a whole.67
Precisely because "it is impossible to eliminate or avoid all risk," Davis
cautions that law firms must "realistically seek to manage risk within acceptable
parameters."6 Those parameters, and the risks attendant to transactional
representation, litigation discovery, and workplace retention, help mark the
multijurisdictional and multinational limits of risk management across the large
law firm legal services industry. To more fully appreciate the normative and
operational limits of risk management, compare the notion of corporate risk
governance in the context of large law firms.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 104 (contending that "the firm must delegate, in a coherent and centralized way, ongoing duties to
control the individual categories of risk identified as concerns"); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Law Firm
General Counsel as Sherpa: Challenges Facing the In-Firm Lawyer's Lawyer, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 835 (2005);
Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Legal Ethics Practice, 14 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHes & PUB.
Pot'Y 103 (2000); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETucs 411 (2008).
64. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 104-05.
65. Id. at 107.
66. Id. at 108; see also Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: The Sources and Uses of Protocols in
Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (2002); Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical
Infrastructures, 68 MD. L. REV. 786 (2009).
67. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 108.
68. Id. at 99.
2011] 999
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETIuCS
B. RISK GOVERNANCE
The notion of risk governance interlinks the fields of corporate and law firm
regulation. Astride of both fields, the concept of "deep governance," borrowed
from insurance scholars Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, comes out of the critical
arena of tort regulation.6 9 For Baker and Griffith, deep governance explicates
"the role of . .. variables such as 'culture' and 'character' in corporate
governance.70 Distinct from the "formal governance structures" commonly
associated with risk management, deep governance as engrafted here embraces
the moral or normative commitments informing the character and culture of a law
firm.7' Law firm institutional character and culture arise out of the interplay of
baseline normative commitments, management protocols, ethics rules, and the
actions of internal and external risk intermediaries. Internal intermediaries
include general counsel and in-house ethics advisors.72 External intermediaries
include insurance underwriters and outside auditors. According to Baker and
Griffith, intermediaries work to "package" and to "transfer" liability risk and
cost, thereby transforming institutional and legal regulation.7 4
Applied to law firm management, the concept of deep governance, with its
emphasis on the decision-making function of corporate character and culture,
illuminates the institutional construction and regulation of liability risk by
partners and associates acting individually and collectively to weigh the costs and
benefits of ethical compliance and moral agency in advocacy. Of necessity, law
firms seek to construct and regulate litigation and transactional proceedings,
assigning cost-related weights and measures to particular risk-taking activities.
They do the same in the area of workplace governance, defining and transforming
the meaning of diversity and discrimination. The upshot is an ethical system or
nomos7 5 of litigation advocacy, transactional negotiation, and workplace hiring
69. Baker & Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance, supra note 36, at 1820-21.
70. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors'and
Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CI. L. REV. 487, 490 (2007) [hereinafter Baker & Griffith,
Predicting Corporate Governance Risk].
7 1. Id.
72. See Elizabeth Chambliss, New Sources of Managerial Authority in Large Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETIcs 63 (2009); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1515 (2006); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General
Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 559 (2002).
73. See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 209 (1996).
74. Baker & Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk, supra note 70, at 490.
75. By nonos, I mean a moral universe implicitly or explicitly constructed by word and deed. See generally
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983);
see also NICHOLAS RESCHER, RISK: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTON TO THE THEORY OF RISK EVALUATION AND
MANAGEMENT 157-67 (1983); Alan Hunt, Risk and Moralization in EverydayLife, in RISKAND MORALITY, supra
note 46, at 165-92; Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Risk, in RISK: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 156-70
(2007).
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embodied in law firm practices, traditions, and overall culture.7 6
Venturing beyond the "easily observable factors" of law firm internal controls
and protocols documented by Davis and exhibited in the instant case studies,
deep governance for Baker and Griffith focuses on both the "culture of the firm"
and the "character of its management."77 Culture-based risk assessment ad-
dresses "the system of incentives and constraints embedded within the firm."
Incentives typically take the form of compensation and promotion.79 Constraints
routinely occupy the form of infrastructure hierarchy and supervision.8 0 By
comparison, character-based risk assessment deals with the behavior and identity
or composition of management. Character-based managerial behavior registers in
actions that enforce rule compliance or "rationalize" rule noncompliance.8
Character-based managerial identity reflects in the staffing of leadership ranks
with either prudent "risk-takers" or "risk-takers above the norm."82
Within corporate organizations and large law firms, culture and character fuse
with a "tournament-style" organizational structure. To compete in corporate
tournaments, Baker and Griffith argue, "executives must cultivate traits such as
'over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical
self-deception."' 8 4 However, they add, the "very traits that enable executives to
succeed also put the firms they manage at greater risk of fraud and failure."
Examples of this social "dynamic" of risk cultivation are displayed here by the
underlying individual lawyer misconduct in the Gellene prosecution and the
76. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Measuring Law Firm Culture, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY:
SPECIAL IssuE: LAW FIRMS, LEGAL CULTURE, AND LEGAL PRACTICE 1-31 (2010) [hereinafter STuDIEs IN LAW];
Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REv. 631 (2005);
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 941 (2007); Mark C.
Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV.
837 (1998).
77. Baker & Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk, supra note 70, at 540.
78. Id.
79. See Elizabeth Chambliss, New Sources of Managerial Authority in Large Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETmcs 63 (2009); Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of "Law Consultants, " 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2006).
80. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law
Firms: A Callfor Research and Reporting, 30 HOFsTRA L. REv. 691 (2002); see also Tanina Rostain, Partners
and Power: The Role of Law Firm Organizational Factors in Attorney Misconduct, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
281 (2006).
81. Baker & Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk, supra note 70, at 524.
82. Id. at 540.
83. Id.; see also MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
BIG LAW FIRM (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Tournament at the Intersection ofBusiness and Legal Ethics,
1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 909 (2004); Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867 (2008).
84. Baker & Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk, supra note 70, at 540 (quoting Donald C.
Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons From the Recent Financial Scandals About
Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat]).
85. Id.
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failure of Milbank to detect and to deter such misconduct,86 as well as by the less
controversial yet still questionable litigation team conduct in Qualcomm and firm
management conduct in Kelley Drye.
The tournament structure of compensation and promotion prevalent in the
legal services industry rewards risk-taking behavior by lawyers and law firms. To
Baker and Griffith, the presence of an analogous "high-stakes promotion
tournament" structure in corporate organizations encourages a "hypercompeti-
tive culture" that in turn "breeds a certain kind of character: one with a tendency
to equate what is self-serving with what is right."87 Building on the work of
Donald Langevoort in the area of securities regulation, Baker and Griffith
reference Langevoort's term "ethical plasticity" to describe this self-serving
character trait common among corporate executives.8 9 By definition, ethical
plasticity implies the willingness and ability to deceive others. Langevoort,
Baker, and Griffith point out that corporate actors "who best deceive others are
usually those who have deceived themselves," observing that such actors
"operate in a cognitively unconflicted way."90 Equipped with the "best survival
prospects in the corporate tournament," a Machiavellian corporate actor,
Langevoort, Baker, and Griffith together note, stands "especially adept at
rationalization: convincing himself as well as others that what is self-serving is
also right."91 Inside the large law firm legal services industry, right judgments in
litigation, transactional, and employment.decisions consistently accord with the
entrepreneurial goals of productivity and profit maximization consonant with
individual and institutional economic self-interest.
In tracking the organizational behavior of corporate firms beset by weak
internal controls, intense competition, and self-serving managers, Baker and
Griffith identify patterns of destructive risk carved in pursuit of entrepreneurial
goals. Pressed by managerial risk-takers, normally corporate directors and
officers, the goals operate as a kind of revealed preference.9 2 In the context of law
86. Id.; see United States v. Gellene, 24 F Supp. 2d 922 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
87. Baker & Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk, supra note 70, at 541 (internal quotations
omitted).
88. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law,
2002 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71; Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of "Corporate Culture" in Law
and Economics, 162 J. INsTmTunONAL & THEoRETIcAL ECON. 80 (2006); Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate
Thermostat, supra note 84; Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEo. L.J. 797 (2001); Donald C.
Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons
of Enron, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 968 (2002).
89. Baker & Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk, supra note 70, at 541 (quoting Langevoort,
Resetting the Corporate Thermostat, supra note 84).
90. Id. (quoting Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat, supra note 84).
91. Id. at 540-41 (quoting Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat, supra note 84) ("Executives
with this type of character in this kind of culture are among the most likely to lead their organizations into a
spiral of ever greater risk taking and, when their luck finally sours, to convert risk taking into fraud.").
92. Id. at 542-43.
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firm risk evaluation, entrepreneurial preference affects both the structural
governance variables of ethics rules and internal controls, and the nonstructural,
deep governance variables of culture and character. Awake to the complexity of
risk evaluation and the force of entrepreneurial preference, Davis contends that a
culture of compliance "alone" furnishes an insufficient "basis for uniform risk
management practices."9 And yet, in summoning the application of external
ethics rules, Davis neglects the troubling impulse of risk deniability and its
adverse impact on lawyer integrity. Turn next to an analysis of risk governance,
deniability, and integrity in the context of legal ethics rules and the legal
profession more generally.
II. RISK DENIABILITY AND INTEGRITY
Risk deniability and integrity stand largely outside Davis's risk management
scheme. To be sure, Davis does make mention of the self-rationalizing tendencies
of individual lawyers or groups of lawyers in deal or litigation teams. He also
suggests that his rule-to-practice management axiom comports with or satisfies
integrity norms, though his assumption that ethics rule compliance serves as the
necessary and sufficient condition for lawyer integrity remains unstated and
untested. Even so bolstered, his management axioms and norms reveal the scant
moral aspiration and spare social function of lawyers in advancing legality and
justice. Encumbered by the profit and productivity demands of material
self-interest, the norms encourage technical rule computations to mitigate
risk-taking behavior detrimental to lawyer or law firm prosperity, rather than to
legality and justice.9 4 Like many lawyers entangled in large law firm culture,
Davis denies the normative insufficiency of lawyer private self-interest and law
firm profitability. Luban, though, addresses the practice of lawyer deniability
through his analysis of contrived ignorance and integrity in legal ethics. 95
Consider first Davis's asserted integration of risk management systems and legal
ethics rules.
A. RISK MANAGEMENT AND LEGAL ETHICS
Davis argues that "the relationship between legal ethics and risk management
is entirely complementary." 9 6 Moreover, he declares "the falsity of [the] notion
that '[t]he systemic preference for private values in risk management regulation
93. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 109.
94. See Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1933-37.
95. See David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 22, at 209. For
a helpful compilation of ethics integrity rules, see Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs
541, 559-62 (2009).
96. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 113.
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undermines the aspirational tradition of legal professionalism."' 97 Here, those
aspirations may go to co-client candor in Gellene, court and adversarial
disclosure in Qualcomm, or workplace equity in Kelley Drye. For Davis, risk
management works to "'encourage aspirations while simultaneously securing
compliance."' 9 8 He points out, for example, that risk management "has a role
when individuals identify an ethical issue, but .. . rationalize a course of action
that an independent observer would regard as ethically inappropriate or otherwise
problematic." 99 This cognitive checking function, however, is limited to recogniz-
ing ethical issues.100 Actual "resolution," he insists, must come from individual
lawyers "in discussions with general counsel or others at the firm regarding the
appropriate resolution of ethical issues."o0 If collaboratively pursued, he adds,
the process of resolution will "likely" help individual lawyers "to develop more
sophisticated capacities for ethical deliberations than they would be able to on
their own." 10 2 In this way, Davis concludes, "risk management actually promotes
individual lawyers' ethical growth."10 3
Furthermore, Davis contends that risk management "does not in any way
detract from each individual lawyer's duties to act in accordance with the
rules." 1" Although "centralized," management structures nonetheless provide
"oversight of ethical compliance" and operate to "support and affirm each
individual lawyer's professional responsibility obligations."105 To Davis, this
compliance-reinforcing function serves to "enable both law firms as institutions
and lawyers as individuals to make more informed and (hopefully) better moral
decisions and ethical judgments." 10 6 Better judgments and "more nuanced
discussion" in turn act to "promote uniform knowledge of and compliance with
ethics rules" governing, for example, conflicts of interest or fact investigation and
discovery.107
For Davis, good risk assessment goes well beyond "technical application" or
"strict compliance with the legalities of the ethics rules."108 Indeed, he contends,
"risk management incorporates considerations such as the likely reactions of the
97. Id. (quoting Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1939).
98. Id. (quoting Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEo. L.J. 1957, 1970 (2006)).
99. Id. Davis remarks that lawyer-law firm "dialogue will evidently take account of the individual lawyer's
perspective including his ethical judgment which may be to minimize the significance of the conflict or to seek a
route to a possible waiver-whereas the law firm can look at the issue from the perspective of the entire
organization." Id. at 120.
100. Id. at 113-14.
101. Id. at 114.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 115.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 118-19 (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 119-20.
108. Id. at 120.
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public, and of clients, and the spirit, not merely the letter, of the law."1 09 Cast
broadly, its systemic purpose is to "elevate the level of ethical decision making by
both the individual and the law firm, and in no way to inhibit moral decision
making by either."no In this way, risk management is not only "the practical
embodiment and the means of implementation of the ethical rules that govern
lawyers' conduct," but also "the necessary component that translates the ethics
rules into practice within law firms.""' On this unbounded logic, the rule-to-
practice ethical translation effected by risk management practices ameliorates
transactional representation, litigation conduct, and workplace governance. The
next section considers the phenomenon of risk deniability in this equation and its
moral consequences for lawyering and law firm management.
B. DENIABILITY AND WILLFUL IGNORANCE
Luban defines deniability in terms of a lawyer's capacity to deny guilty
knowledge truthfully. 112 To Luban, deniability functions as a stratagem "to avoid
facts that the lawyer really doesn't want to know," 1 3 whether in advocacy,
negotiation, or workplace hiring and promotion. He connects. deniability to
willful ignorance,1 14 focusing on a lawyer's or a law firm's deliberate efforts to
avoid guilty knowledge prior to committing any misdeed-in this case Gellene's
conflict of interest and Milbank's concurrent representation in the Bucyrus-Erie
bankruptcy as well as Kelley Drye's enforcement of its age-based partner
de-equitization policy. The structure of deniability in organizations like Milbank
and Kelley Drye screens individuals-partners and associates-from liability for
ethical misdeeds, especially when they act at a distance with imperfect
information."' 5 Together, institutional distance and imperfect information permit
individual lawyers to avoid acknowledging their affirmative screening actions
and unwitting misdeeds.' 16 Screening actions or omissions shield lawyers from
unwanted knowledge, for example, of conflicts of interest, discovery abuse, or
age discrimination. Unwitting misdeeds, such as concurrent representation or
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 123-24.
112. Alfieri, Jim Crow Ethics, supra note 22, at 1689-99.
113. Luban, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 95, at 210. For David Luban, "[d]eniability is the key to
succeeding at the world's work, which is often dirty, while keeping a clean conscience." Id. at 211.
114. Id. at 211-13.
115. Id. at 216 (remarking that "supervisors structure the organization to preserve their own deniability");
see also Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands unto Themselves?An Empirical Study ofLaw Firm
Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL Encs 271, 306-08 (1997); Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm
Partners as Their Brothers'Keepers, 96 Ky. L.J. 231, 263-73 (2008); William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance
and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 12-20 (2005); Thomas
A. Kuczajda, Note, SelfRegulation, Socialization, and the Role ofModel Rule 5.1, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 119,
126-36 (1998).
116. See Luban, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 95, at 213-22.
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discovery nondisclosure, fall innocent when performed out of legitimate
ignorance rather than with varying degrees of individual and institutional mens
rea-here, willfulness, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. 117
For Luban, ignorance obtained from wrongfully screening oneself from guilty
knowledge is itself blameworthy. Under his culpable-ignorance theory, both the
wrongful screening action and the "unwitting misdeed" share blame because
screening actions put the lawyer on notice of potential wrongdoing."s This
implied principal-agent complicity unites screening actions and wrongful
misdeeds into a single framework of analysis applicable when the lawyer-as-
agent ratifies the screening decision of the lawyer-as-principal to avoid poten-
tially guilty knowledge. 19 Complicity links willful blindness to a culpable state
of mind for unwitting misdeeds.12 0 Milbank's complicity in Gellene's ethical
misconduct rises out of its willful institutional ignorance of inconvenient
knowledge pertaining to conflicts of interest1 2 1 and the related lack of candor
among its bankruptcy and corporate partners, a form of ethical opacity common
to large firm corporate litigation conduct. 12 2 Both misdeeds implicate questions
of integrity and dissonance.
C. DENIABILITY AND DISSONANCE
Luban searches social psychology to determine the psychic machinations of
lawyer deniability and conduct-principle dissonance in belief modification and
social cognition. 123 Lawyers struggle to overcome cognitive dissonance, he
explains, either by modifying their conduct to conform to their principles or by
modifying their principles and prior beliefs, here in cases of transactional
counseling and litigation candor. Principle-driven conformity risks inflexibility,
for example, when conflicts of interest preclude joint representation, while belief
modification risks counter-attitudinal actions, for example, when candor de-
117. Id. at 222-23.
118. Id. at 225.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 211.
121. See id. at 229-36; see also Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers Are Morally Accountable, 70
FoRDHAM L. REv. 1805, 1807-09 (2002); W. Bradley Wendel, Regulation of Lawyers Without the Code, the
Rules, or the Restatement: Or What Do Honor and Shame Have to Do with Civil Discovery Practice?, 71
FORDHAM L. REv. 1567, 1577-86 (2003).
122. See Luban, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 95, at 234-35 (discussing the ethical and moral
repercussions of lawyers engaging in "willful blindness"); see also Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of
Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 709, 716-19 (1998) (attributing
aggressive and dishonest litigation tactics in part to law firm culture and structural causes).
123. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of
Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 629 (1997);
Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for
Clients'Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75 (1993).
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volves into nondisclosure. 12 4 Luban observes self-rationalizing "counterattitudi-
nal advocacy" in the moral world of lawyers and law firms, such as age-driven
partner de-equitization, a world of continuous after-the-fact justification moti-
vated by cognitive threats to the integrity of an individual's self-concept. 12 5 He
asserts that lawyers intuitively refashion their moral beliefs and perceptions to
rationalize their own behavior. 12 6 Counter-attitudinal advocacy, he notes, typi-
cally channels beliefs toward the goals of client advocacy, as in Gellene and
Qualcomm, though the more self-regarding goals of profit maximization and
promotion may suffice as well, as in Kelley Drye.127 Institutional contexts-for
example, law firms-influence this cognitive channeling, shaping individual and
collective worldviews through the reciprocal reinforcement of perception and
belief in practice groups and litigation or deal teams. 1 2 8
Unlike Davis, -Luban acknowledges that the litigation and transactional
situations within law firms, practice groups, and advocacy or deal teams may not
only dominate individual personality, 12 9 but also overpower moral character, here
resulting in transactional misconduct, discovery abuse, and workplace discrimi-
nation. 13 0 Yet, citing belief-action variation among individuals, 31  Luban en-
dorses personality theory and the viability of situational dissent in spite of
environmental pressure and temptation. 13 2 This opposition to situational determin-
ism and institutionally scripted roles preserves the possibility of moral discretion
and professional integrity in regulating deal transactions, litigation contests, and
workplace hiring decisions. 1 3 3
To Luban, moral discretion reasons contextually from an applied set of right or
reasonable principles. 13 4 Professional integrity rests on value-action harmony or
124. See David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HuMAN DIGNITY, supra note 22,
at 267, 268 [hereinafter Luban, Integrity].
125. Id. at 269; see also Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of
Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1399, 1413-24 (2000); William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The
Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 243,
268-82 (1998).
126. Luban, Integrity, supra note 124, at 268.
127. See id. at 269-71.
128. See id. at 271-81.
129. See id. at 281 ("[T]here are no selves, only selves-in-roles, selves who slide frictionlessly from role to
role, in each case conforming to the expectations of the role and whatever principles of right behavior come
attached to its script.").
130. See id. at 281-82.
131. Id. at 283.
.132. David Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 22,
at 237, 245-47.
133. Luban, Integrity, supra note 124, at 284-85; see also Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the
Possibility ofIntegrity, 70 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1629 (2002); Deborah L. Rhode, IfIntegrity Is the Answer What Is
the Question?, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 333 (2003) [hereinafter Rhode, IfIntegrity is the Answer].
134. See Luban, Integrity, supra note 124, at 286-87 (citing Rhode, If Integrity is the Answer, supra note
133, at 335-36).
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equilibrium in practice.13 5 Of necessity, both discretion and integrity require
line-drawing, counter-intuitive reflection, and chronic skepticism. 136 Embodied
in Luban's Socratic "stance of perpetual doubt toward one's own pretensions as
well as the pretensions of others" in the world, a stance that instills the crucial
"habit of doubting one's own righteousness, of questioning one's own moral
beliefs, of scrutinizing one's own behavior,"' 3 7 these cognitive and interpretive
strategies seem distressingly absent from Davis's compliance-reinforcing sys-
tems of risk management.138 Likewise, they seem lacking in each of the three
instant case studies, gauged by either moral reasoning or behavioral insight. To
further appreciate the normative insufficiency of Davis's paradigm of private
self-interest and law firm profitability, consider the risks of lawyer deniability and
contrived ignorance in the litigation, transactional, and workplace settings of the
case studies below.
III. RISK DENIABILITY: THREE CASE STUDIES
Risk deniability infects the transactional, litigation, and workplace employ-
ment conduct of lawyers and law firms. The risks of lawyer deniability and
contrived ignorance in law firm employment and retention, concurrent transac-
tional representation, and complex litigation discovery find useful illustration in
the below studies of the Kelley Drye, Gellene, and Qualcomm cases. At the
outset, turn to the state of Big Law diversity and, more specifically, to the
discrimination risk embedded in the still ongoing employment dispute in Kelley
Drye.
A. DISCRIMINATION RISK: BIG LAW DIVERSITY
Risk governance and diversity variables related to the large firm legal services
industry intersect throughout the lawyer hiring, promotion, and retention process.
Within the large firm workplace, that employment process routinely involves the
consideration and assessment of exclusion and inclusion risks. Under Davis's
paradigm, both exclusion and inclusion risks involve the analysis of probability
and economic loss. Exclusion risk refers to the danger of unintended and harmful
consequences to a law firm stemming from a decision to exclude a diversity
candidate from hiring, promotion, or retention as a partner or an associate.
Conversely, inclusion risk refers to the danger of unintended and harmful
consequences to a law firm flowing from a decision to include a diversity
candidate in hiring, promotion, or retention as a partner or an associate. The
institutional calculation of exclusion and inclusion risk affects the quality and
135. See id. at 274.
136. See id. at 286-88, 296-97.
137. Id. at 297.
138. See id. at 285-97.
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quantity of workplace diversity in the legal services industry across differences of
age, gender, and race.
The history of discrimination in the American legal profession is far
reaching.' 39 By now well chronicled, this history spans a plurality of intersecting
identities crisscrossing gender, race, ethnicity, disability, sexuality, and, more
recently, age.140 Gender discrimination, infecting workplace structures14 1 and
pervading law firms,14 2 continues to garner critical attention. 14 3 Evidence
suggests that gender discrimination persistently hampers women's advancement
in large law firms" and inhibits their promotion to partnership and other
positions of firm leadership. 145 Despite various diversity initiatives,14 6 part-
ners, 14 7 associates, 14 8 and even student summer associates regularly encounter
gender-based workplace constraints, 14 9 alternate partnership tracks, 150 and other
139. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA
(1976); NEW YORK CrrY BAR, 2010 LAW FIRM DIVERSITY BENCHMARKING REPORT' REPORT TO SIGNATORIES OF
THE STATEMENT OF DIVERSITY PRINCIPLES (2010), available at http://nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/decisions/
012611barreport.pdf; Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law.Firms, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1803
(2008).
140. See ABA PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE COMM'N ON DIVERSTY, DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE
NExT STEPS (2010), available at http://www2.americanbar.org/centers/diversity-migrated/PublicDocuments/
Next%20Steps%2OFinal-Virtual%20Accessible%20042010.pdf.
141. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits ofAntidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L.
REv. 1 (2006); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001); see also Note, A Proposal for Law Schools to Combat Structural Discrimination at
Law Firms Through Management-Based Regulation, 120 HARV. L. REv. 2156 (2007).
142. See generally Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 859 (2005); Marfa Pab6n L6pez, The Future of Women in the
Legal Profession: Recognizing the Challenges Ahead by Reviewing Current Trends, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
53 (2008); Rhode, Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, supra note 10, at 1054-57; Deborah L. Rhode,
The Subtle Side of Sexism, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 613 (2007); Eyana J. Smith, Employment Discrimination
in the Firm: Does the Legal System Provide Remedies for Women and Minority Members of the Bar?, 6 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 789 (2004).
143. See Rhode, Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, supra note 10, at 1059-72; Deborah L. Rhode,
Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem Problem, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1001 (2002); Deborah L. Rhode &
Diane C. Yu, The ABA Goal IX Commission Reports: Tracking Progress and Trends, PERSPECTIVES, Summer
2008, at 16.
144. See Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the
Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2245 (2010).
145. See Fiona M. Kay & John Hagan, Cultivating Clients in the Competition for Partnership: Gender and
the Organizational Restructuring of Law Firms in the 1990s, 33 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 517 (1999); Rhode,
Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, supra note 10, at 1042-44.
146. On diversity initiatives, see Joanne P. Braithwaite, Diversity Staff and the Dynamics of Diversity
Policy-Making in Large Law Firms, 13 LEGAL ETHICS 141 (2010); Anjali Chavan, Note, The "Charles Morgan
Letter" and Beyond: The Impact ofDiversity Initiatives on Big Law, 23 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 521 (2010).
147. See Lauren Winters, Partners Without Power: Protecting Law Firm Partners from Discrimination, 39
U.S.F. L. Rev. 413 (2005).
148. See Ernest F. Lidge III, Law Firm Employment Discrimination in Case Assignments at the Client's
Insistence: A Bona Fide Occupational Qualification?, 38 CONN. L. REv. 159 (2005).
149. See Kathleen E. Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Assimilation, Choice, or Constraint? Testing Theories of
Gender Differences in the Careers of Lawyers, 79 SoC. FORCES 229 (2000); Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S.
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forms of harassment1 5' and inequality1 5 2 that adversely impact upon earnings,
satisfaction, and retention. 5 3 Attributable in part to differential treatment of
childbearing and child rearing family responsibilities, 15 4 as well as mentoring
system failure,155 gender discrimination often merges with racial bias to doubly
burden women of color.1 56
Lawyers of color, particularly African American lawyers,' 5 7 often suffer
race-based discrimination in large law firms, even subsequent to promotion and
partnership. 58 Likewise, Asian American,15 Latino/a,16 0 and other minority
Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring: Deconstructing and Reconstructing Workplace Opportunities for Women
Lawyers, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 923 (2002).
150. See Vivia Chen, Looking into the Equity Box, AM. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 13; Danielle M. Evans, Note,
Non-Equity Partnership: A Flawed Solution to the Disproportionate Advancement of Women in Private Law
Firms, 28 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 93 (2007); see also William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-7ier
Versus Two-7ier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1691 (2006).
151. See Jay Marhoefer, Note, The Quality of Mercy Is Strained: How the Procedures of Sexual Harassment
Litigation Against Law Firms Frustrate Both the Substantive Law of Title VII and the Integration of an Ethic of
Care into the Legal Profession, 78 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 817 (2003).
152. See Bryant G. Garth & Joyce Sterling, Exploring Inequality in the Corporate Law Firm Apprenticeship:
Doing the Time, Finding the Love, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 1361 (2009).
153. See Joan C. Williams & Veta T. Richardson, New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling?: The Impact ofLaw
Firm Compensation Systems on Women (2010), available at http://www.attomeyretention.org/Publications/
SameGlassCeiling.pdf; Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete
Ceilings in Legal Careers, 14 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 27 (2004).
154. See Heather Bennett Stanford, Do You Want to Be an Attorney or a Mother? Arguing for a Feminist
Solution to the Problem of Double Binds in Employment and Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 17 AM.
U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 627 (2009); Joan C. Williams et al., Law Firms as Defendants: Family
Responsibilities Discrimination in Legal Workplaces, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 393 (2007); Joan C. Williams &
Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FRED": Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in
the Law ofStereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311 (2008); see also Christen Linke Young, Note,
Childbearing, Childrearing, and Title VII: Parental Leave Policies at Large American Law Firms, 118 YALE
L.J. 1182 (2009).
155. See Elizabeth K. McManus, Intimidation and the Culture ofAvoidance: Gender Issues and Mentoring
in Large Firm Practice, 33 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 217 (2005).
156. See Theresa M. Beiner, Not All Lawyers Are Equal: Difficulties that Plague Women and Women of
Color, 58 SYRACUSE L. REv. 317 (2008).
157. See Leonard M. Baynes, Falling Through the Cracks: Race and Corporate Law Finns, 77 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 785 (2003); John M. Conley, Tales ofDiversity: Lawyers'Narratives ofRacial Equity in Private Firms, 31
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 831 (2006); Monique R. Payne-Pikus et al., Experiencing Discrimination: Race and
Retention in America's Largest Low Firms, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 553 (2010); Richard H. Sander, The Racial
Paradox of the Corporate Low Firm, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1755 (2006); David B. Wilkins, From "Separate is
Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and
the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004) [hereinafter Wilkins, From "Separate is
Inherently Unequal "]. See generally James Lindgren, The Private and Public Employment ofAfrican-American
Lawyers, 1960-2000, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 281 (2008).
158. See David B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate
Law Firms, 2 J. INsT. STUDY LEGAL ETmcs 15 (1999).
159. See Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRUCAL
LEGAL STUD. 886 (2010); Akshat Tewary, Legal Ethics as a Means to Address the Problem of Elite Law Firm
Non-Diversity, 12 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2005).
160. See Cruz Reynoso, A Survey of Latino Lawyers in Los Angeles County-Their Professional Lives and
Opinions, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1563 (2005).
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lawyers 6 1 confront a racialized legacy of bias and discrimination, 16 2 notwithstand-
ing the myth of meritocracy in the legal profession. 1 6 3 Current demographic
changes M  and regulatory debates over partnership rules 16 5 have extended that
legacy to include age discrimination.
Documented in a variety of employment settings,166 especially where manda-
tory1retirement policies operate, 16 age discrimination disputes now emerge with
greater frequency in large law firm contexts.16 8 Incidents of discrimination often
involve the de-equitization and expulsion of older partners. 169 Recent challenges
to partner de-equitization in EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood 170 and in
161. See Emily Barker, One Step Back, AM. LAW., Mar. 2010, at 71. On color, marginal whiteness, and
whiteness studies, see Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497 (2010).
162. See Tiffani N. Darden, The Law Firm Caste System: Constructing a Bridge Between Workplace Equity
Theory & the Institutional Analyses of Bias in Corporate Law Firms, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 85 (2009).
163. See Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 585 (1996).
164. See Marc Galanter, "Old and In the Way": The Coming Demographic Transformation of the Legal
Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wisc. L. REv. 1081 (1999); see also
American Bar Association Urges Law Firms to Jettison Mandatory Age-Based Retirement, 76 LAW. MANUAL
PROF. CoNDucr 2108 (2007); Panel Speakers Discuss Increase in Ranks of Older Lawyers, Implications for
Profession, 22 LAW. MANUAL PROF. CoNDucr 89 (2006).
165. See Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as "Employees" Under
the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 3 (2004); Martha Neil, Who Is a Partner? The EEOC Looks
Beyond Titles in Its Age Discrimination Case Against a Law Firm, 91 A.B.A. J. 34 (2005); Catherine Lovly &
Matthew J. Mehnert, Note, Something Every Lawyer Needs to Know: The Employer-Employee Distinction in
the Modern Law Firm, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 663 (2004).
166. See Kenneth R. Davis, Age Discrimination and Disparate Impact: A New Look at an Age-Old Problem,
70 BROOK. L. REV. 361 (2005); Jessica Fink, A Crumbling Pyramid: How the Evolving Jurisprudence Defining
'Employee' Under the ADEA Threatens the Basic Structure of the Modem Large Law Firm, 6 HAsTINGS Bus.
L.J. 35 (2010); Michael E. Franke, Note, Age Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
A Two-Way Street Blocked in One Direction, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 673 (2004).
167. See Lillian Kim, Comment, Mandatory Retirement in the Private Sector: The Reach (or Inapplicability)
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Domestically and Abroad, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1209 (2010); Anna
P. Stem, Note, Heeding the Callfor the End of Mandatory Retirement, 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 1095 (2008).
168. See Donald J. Labriola, Comment, "But I'm Denny Crane!": Age Discrimination in the Legal
Profession After Sidley, 72 ALB. L. REv. 367 (2009); Lorie A. Taylor, Comment, Age Discrimination Against
Senior Law Firm Partners: When Law Firms Treat Partners as Employees, 6 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 227 (2004); see
also Marc Galanter, Tournament of Jokes: Generational Tension in Large Law Firms, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1437
(2006).
169. See Robert W. Hillman, Law Firm Risk Management in an Era of Breakups and Lawyer Mobility:
Limitations and Opportunities, 43 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 449, 463-65 (2011); Douglas R. Richmond, Expelling
Law Firm Partners, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93 (2009); Nelson D. Schwartz, Easing Out the Gray-Haired. Or Not.,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/business/economy/28worker.html?
pagewanted=all; Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Firms Use Downturn as Opportunity to Ax Older Partners,
Recruiter Says, A.B.A. J., May 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/nevs/articlellaw-firms_usedownturn_
as_excusetoax older_partnersrecruitersays.
170. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002). For background on the initial
EEOC investigation, see EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, No. 01-C-9635, 2002 WL 206485 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2002),
and subsequent history of the 2005 ADEA suit, see EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, 406 F. Supp. 2d
991 (N.D. Ill. 2005). See also Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, So, You Want to Be a Partner at Sidley &
Austin?, 40 Hous. L. REV. 969 (2003); David B. Wilkins, Partner Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1264 (2007); Rachel M. Milazzo, Note, Circular Definitions of What Constitutes an
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EEOC v. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP17 brought under the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act1 7 2 (ADEA) illustrate these rising trends.
Reported declines in domestic and global law firm "gross revenue, profits, and
productivity (as measured by revenue per lawyer) from 2007 to 2009"173 at
leading firms seem likely to accelerate age-specific de-equitization and expulsion
trends while the legal services market stabilizes. 17 4
Discrimination risk, and the allied concept of exclusion and inclusion risk,
constitutes a structural and nonstructural variable in Big Law workplace hiring,
promotion, and retention. From a structural standpoint, discrimination risk is
subject to management regulation through hiring and promotion protocols,
mentoring systems, and retention procedures. From a nonstructural perspective,
discrimination risk is susceptible to deep governance regulation under cultural
norms of diversity, equal opportunity, and workplace equity. The ongoing
controversy in Kelley Drye shows the strength of discrimination risk in large law
firms and the weakness of structural and nonstructural compliance regulation
relevant to diversity.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)175 instituted a civil
action in January 2010 under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act17 6
charging Kelley Drye with unlawful age-based discriminatory employment
practices and retaliation against Eugene T. D'Ablemont and a similarly situated
class of employees.177 D'Ablemont, age seventy-nine at the commencement of
the action, joined Kelley Drye in 1959, reached "Partner" status in 1969, and
converted to "Life Partner" status in 2000.17' The EEOC alleged that Kelley Drye
created a compensation system that "significantly undercompensated" D'Ablemont
and other attorneys who continued to perform work past the age of seventy
"solely on the basis of their age."179 More specifically, the EEOC claimed that
Employee: Determining Whether the Partners of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood Qualify as Employers or
Employees Under Federal Law, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1329 (2007).
171. See Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Sues Law Firm Kelley Drye &
Warren for Age Discrimination and Retaliation (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
release/ -28-10a.cfm. .
172. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
173. Michael D. Goldhaber, Losing Ground, AM. LAw., Oct. 2010, at 131,131.
174. William D. Henderson & Leonard Bierman, An Empirical Analysis ofLateral Lawyer Trends from 2000
to 2007: The Emerging Equilibrium for Corporate Law Firms, 22 GEo. J. LEGAL Erics 1395 (2009).
175. The EEOC is a federal agency charged with the administration, interpretation, and enforcement of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). See Complaint and Jury Trial Demand at 1-2, EEOC v. Kelley
Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 0655, 2010 WL 442091 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://docs.
justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/l:2010cv00655/357752/1.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2010).
177. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 175, at 1.
178. Preliminary Pre-trial Statement at 3, EEOC v. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 0655 (LTS)
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:
2010cv00655/357752/9/.
179. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 175, at 1.
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Kelley Drye, since at least 2001, "operated under a Partnership Agreement that
requires all attorneys who reach the age of 70 and wish to continue to practice law
to give up any equity interest" in the law firm. 180 Further, the EEOC claimed that
the Partnership Agreement dictated that D'Ablemont and others similarly
situated "relinquish their authority to manage or significantly influence the firm,"
and limit their compensation for work performed to "an annual 'bonus' payment"
distributed at the discretion of the firm's Executive Committee, 8 t even when
such compensation proved "significantly less than that paid to younger attorneys
in the firm with similar client collections, billings, and other measures of
productivity."1 8 2 For relief, the EEOC requested a permanent injunction enjoin-
ing Kelley Drye from engaging in age-based discriminatory employment
practices, an order directing the firm to implement policies, practices, and
programs that provide equal employment opportunities for employees forty years
of age and older and that eradicate the effects of past and present unlawful
employment practices, and an order awarding back wages, compensatory,
liquidated, and punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and costs.18 3 In April
2010, Kelley Drye denied the EEOC's allegations of discrimination;18 4 nonethe-
less, the firm quickly revised its mandatory retirement policy of senior partner
de-equitization. 8
5
The discrimination risk in Kelley Drye strains Davis's risk management model
of regulation. Although the elaboration of structural, age-specific retention
procedures and nonstructural, age-based diversity norms might enlarge the ambit
of his regulatory model, the express overarching commitment to economic
self-interest realized through profit and productivity militates against effective
expansion. Moreover, notwithstanding Davis's rule-to-practice axiom, ethics
rules supply little or no countervailing force against the weight of the blunt
lawyer and law firm self-interest manifested in Kelley Drye. In the same way,
exclusion risks offer meager regulatory incentive. Here, for example, there is no
fear of labor pool contraction or revenue loss, scarce concern about social capital
180. Id. at 3.
181. Id.
. 182. Id. at 3-4. The EEOC added:
In 2008, subsequent to his filing his ADEA charge with the [EEOC], [the firm]'s annual 'bonus'
payment to D'Ablemont was reduced from $75,000 to $25,000, even though his collections and other
measures of productivity were similar to those in previous years, in retaliation for his complaining
about [the firm]'s discriminatory compensation system and his filing of his charge with the [EEOC].
Id. The EEOC subsequently charged that such retaliation continued in 2009 and 2010. Amended Complaint and
Jury Trial Demand at 4, EEOC v. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 0655 (LTS) 2010 WL 4019013
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2010), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/l:
2010cv00655/357752/20.
183. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 175, at 4-5.
184. Answer, EEOC v. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 0655 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010),
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2010cv00655/357752/7/.
185. Nate Raymond, Facing EEOC Suit, Kelley Drye Drops Retirement Policy, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9, 2010, at 1.
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erosion and institutional succession, and no apprehension over human capital
attrition and replacement cost, rather only an efficiency-driven economic
calibration of litigation and settlement (i.e., "cash out") cost. These conscious,
cost-benefit calculations leave discrimination risk largely unregulated in Big Law
workplaces. Compare this regulatory outcome to the management of transac-
tional risk.
B. TRANSACTIONAL RISK: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Transactional risk emanating from conflicts of interest falls within the helpful
frameworks erected by Reganl 8 6 and Simon1 87 for the analysis of moral
discretion and other-regarding obligations in large law firms. My previous
analysis employed Regan's corporate law research as a starting point for an
assessment of law firm risk management norms. 188 Regan describes the
prosecution of Milbank partner John Gellene for making false declarations in a
corporate bankruptcy proceeding. 18 9 For many, Gellene's prosecution signals the
breakdown of classical norms of professionalism in lawyer regulation and law
firm organization. Regan's account locates this normative disintegration in the
context of large law firm corporate bankruptcy practice, thereby connecting the
partnership tournament at Milbank to the norms of transactional lawyers in large
firms and the moral universe constructed by elite teams of specialists within
corporate and bankruptcy law. 190
Regan traces the evolution of the large law firm from the late nineteenth
century to the early twenty-first century, charting the rise of new market pressures
and global corporate competition.1 91 These cultural and socioeconomic forces, he
explains, rationalized law firm hierarchical infrastructures, reorganized practice
groups, encouraged institutional merger and migration, and instilled entrepreneur-
ial revenue incentives.1 92 The industry-wide result enlarged the influence of
partnership tournaments, practice specialties, and project teams on lawyer
behavior and moral discretion. This shift is illustrated by Milbank's adoption of a
new business plan in the mid-1980s, which emphasized revenue generation and
lateral partner recruitment from rival firms specializing in lucrative corporate
practice areas.
186. See REGAN, supra note 6; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Firm
Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 931 (2002); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the
Values of Professionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 1 (1999).
187. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 6; see also William H. Simon, The Ethics Teacher's
Bittersweet Revenge: Virtue and Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2006).
188. See Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1933-40.
189. REGAN, supra note 6, at 235-88.
190. See Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1911-13.
191. REGAN, supra note 6, at 30-32.
192. Id. at 34-37.
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Gellene's prosecution follows from Milbank's transition from an old-line, Wall
Street law firm into an entrepreneurial culture of partner competition over
productivity and profitability.1 9 3 In 1993, Gellene earned $1.86 million in fees for
Milbank in representing the Bucyrus-Erie Company, a Wisconsin mining and
construction equipment manufacturer, in corporate bankruptcy reorganization
proceedings. 1 9 4 In 1996, Bucyrus-Erie and its creditors sought sanctions, fee
disgorgement, and judicial revocation of Milbank as bankruptcy counsel for
failure to disclose its concurrent representation of the major secured creditor of
the company. 9" In 1997, a federal district court found Milbank in violation of
federal bankruptcy rules; subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted Gellene on
three criminal counts.19 6 In 1998, a federal jury issued a guilty verdict on all
counts, resulting in a fifteen-month sentence for Gellene. 19 7
In his appraisal of the Bucyrus-Erie case, Davis cites "structural" and
"operational" flaws in Milbank's client intake and oversight system, and
Gellene's individual ethical failures in assessing actual or potential conflicts
of interest." He comments that Milbank's client intake system "gave
disproportionate (or, possibly, complete) authority to individual partners to
make client intake decisions," evidently "did not require adequate informa-
tion to be submitted for independent review prior to the commencement of
work for new clients," and provided "inadequate or no independent review of
client intake decisions on behalf.of and on the part of the law firm."1 99 Good
risk management, Davis complains, would have "enabled" Milbank to assist
Gellene "both by educating him as to the appropriate principles and rules and
also as to the scale of the potentially adverse consequences that would flow
from a misguided decision."2 00 Effectively managed, Davis emphasizes, such
dialogue would have compelled Gellene to "collaborate with the firm in
,,201
making a fully informed ethical judgment to his and the firm's advantage.
Significantly, he concedes that both stances-individual self-interest and
institutional advantage-arise out of the "tournament culture" and "eat what
you kill" compensation structure dominating the large law firm legal services
193. On the conflation of financial performance and professional values in law firm culture, see Deborah
Rhode, Profits and Professionalism, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 49,49-57 (2005).
194. Alfieri, The Fall ofLegal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1920.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 1920-21.
197. Id. at 1921. On conflicts of interest in organizational representation, see Susan P. Shapiro,
Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 8.7 (2003); William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An
Anatomy ofIntraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REv. 57 (2003).
198. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 122 ("Experience shows that individual
partners seeking to introduce business often make faulty judgments about conflict of interest issues.").
199. Id.
200. Id. at 123.
201. Id.
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industry and Milbank's partnership ranks since the 1980s.2 02 To that extent,
he adds, both culture and compensation constitute "contributing underlying
causes for [Milbank's] risk management failure."2 0 3 To ascertain whether the
same management failure may infect litigation, consider discovery-related
litigation risk in Qualcomm.
C. LITIGATION RISK: DISCOVERY
Litigation risk in discovery is highlighted by the protracted sanction proceed-
ings in Qualcomm,2 04 a widely reported civil action in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California seeking injunctive relief and compensatory
damages for patent infringement.20 5 Qualcomm initiated its federal action in
2005, alleging Broadcom's multi-count patent infringement through the manufac-
ture and sale of H.264-compliant products.2 06 Broadcom responded that the
disputed patents were unenforceable due to Qualcomm's inequitable conduct and
waiver, specifically its 2002-2003 participation in the Joint Video Team (JVT), a
video technology "standards-setting body that created the H.264 standard."2 07
In discovery, Broadcom sought information concerning Qualcomm's participa-
tion in the JVT via interrogatories, depositions, and document production
requests.2 0 8 Qualcomm pledged to "'produce non-privileged relevant and
responsive documents describing QUALCOMM's participation in the JVT, if
202. See id. at 122. Davis points out that "law firm culture can operate either to enhance, or in the worst
instances, effectively to disable, client intake management systems," noting that "compensation structures, such
as those that reward 'eat what you kill' behavior, are likely to lead lawyers to try to undermine or avoid
independent review of the decision to bring on new work." Id. at 101-02; see also Andrew Bruck & Andrew
Canter, Note, Supply, Demand, and the Changing Economics of Large Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REv. 2087
(2008).
203. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 122.
204. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm II), No. 05cvl958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for sanctions and sanctioning
Qualcomm and six individual attorneys), vacated in part, No. 05cvl958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D.
Cal. Mar. 5, 2008) (vacating order denying the self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilege and
remanding only with regard to the six attorney objectors).
205. Id. at *1; see also Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm 1), 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (S.D.
Cal. 2007), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For helpful commentary, see Panel
Discussion, Sanctions in Electronic Discovery Cases: Views from the Judges, 78 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1, 24-29
(2009) (comments of Judge John M. Facciola); Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer's E-volving
Duties in Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REv. 521 (2009); Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding
Unprofessional Conduct in e-Discovery, 60 MERCER L. REv. 983 (2009). See also Thomas Allman, Deterring
E-Discovery Misconduct with Counsel Sanctions: The Unintended Consequences of Qualcomm v. Broadcom,
118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 161, 165 (2009); William T. Gallagher, IP Legal Ethics in the Everyday Practice of
Law: An Empirical Perspective on Patent Litigators, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PRop. L. 309 (2011).
206. Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at * 1; Qualcomm 1, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
207. Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at *1. Under the doctrine of waiver, Qualcomm's 2002-2003
participation in the Joint Video Team (JVT) H.264 standard-setting process would preclude infringement
actions against companies like Broadcom. Id. at *3.
208. Id. at *2.
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any, which can be located after a reasonable search"' and "'responsive
non-privileged documents that were given to or received from [the relevant]
standards-setting body."' 9 Qualcomm insisted that it first attended a JVT
meeting in December 2003 and that it submitted the first of four JVT proposals in
January 2006.210
At trial, Qualcomm denied participating in the JVT in 2002-2003. Nonethe-
less, in January 2007, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Broadcom
finding non-infringement of the patents at issue and a unanimous advisory verdict
in favor of Broadcom finding the patents unenforceable due to Qualcomm's
inequitable conduct and waiver.2 11 In post-trial hearings and negotiations, the
Qualcomm litigation team "continued to vigorously argue no participation [in the
JVT] and no foul play" and "to insist that they had conducted a reasonable search
for responsive documents during discovery .... "2 12 By letter dated February 16,
2007, a Qualcomm attorney advised Broadcom: "'[w]e continue to believe that
Qualcomm performed a reasonable search of Qualcomm's documents in
response to Broadcom's Requests for Production .... '"2 13
In March 2007, U.S. Senior District Judge Rudi M. Brewster found
clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm, its employees, and its witnesses
actively organized and/or participated in a plan to profit heavily by (1)
wrongfully concealing the patents-in-suit while participating in the JVT and
then (2) actively hiding this concealment from the Court, the jury, and opposing
counsel during the present litigation.214
Judge Brewster cited evidence of Qualcomm's "aggravated litigation abuse" in
discovery through "constant stonewalling, concealment, and repeated misrepre-
sentations" and in trial through the repeated presentation of false witness
testimony.2 15 Judge Brewster also found "clear and convincing evidence that
Qualcomm counsel participated in an organized program of litigation misconduct
and concealment throughout discovery, trial, and post-trial" proceedings.2 16
Based on these findings, Judge Brewster concluded that Qualcomm waived its
rights to enforce the patents in controversy. 217
209. Id. (quoting Qualcomm attorney's response to discovery request).
210. Id.
211. Id. at *5.
212. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm 1), 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1245-46 (S.D. Cal. 2007),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
213. Id. at 1246.
214. Id. at 1228.
215. Id. at 1227-28; see also Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm Ill), No. 05cv1958-B (BLM),
2008 WL 66932, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), vacated in part, No. 05cvl958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 5,2008).
216. Qualcomm 1, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1234-35.
217. Id. at 1249.
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In April 2007, both Qualcomm's outside counsel and General Counsel
admitted in separate letters that Qualcomm had discovered "'thousands' of
unproduced, responsive electronic documents that "'appear to be inconsistent
with arguments that [counsel] made at trial, and at the post-trial hearing."' 2 1 8
Concurrent with these admissions, outside counsel apologized "'for asserting
positions that [they] would not have taken had [they] known of the existence of
these documents."' 2 1 9 In December 2007, Judge Brewster awarded Broadcom
$8,568,633.24 in attorneys' fees, expert fees, and litigation costs, and $691,351.85
in prejudgment interest for a total of $9,259,985.09 to sanction Qualcomm's "bad
faith litigation misconduct." 2 20
Upon referral from the district court in 2007, U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara L.
Major probed Qualcomm's disputed litigation conduct, especially regarding the
management of discovery.221 In an initial post-trial report subsequently vacated
in part, Magistrate Major characterized Qualcomm's discovery responses as
"troubling," noting that its own designated deposition witnesses testified falsely
about their knowledge of and involvement in the JVT, and deriding Qualcomm's
company-wide failure to "search" witnesses' computers for relevant docu-
ments.222
On January 7, 2008, Magistrate Major granted in part and denied in part
Broadcom's motion for sanctions against Qualcomm and its individual law-
yers.223 Although later revisited and substantially revised, the Magistrate initially
found that Qualcomm not only "intentionally withheld tens of thousands of
documents" requested in discovery by Broadcom, but also failed to exercise "any
meaningful oversight of its document production."22 4 The "suppressed docu-
ments," according to the Magistrate, "directly contradicted a key argument
advanced by Qualcomm in pretrial motions and throughout trial and supported a
defense asserted by Broadcom." 2 2 5 The Magistrate also found that a total of "six
attorneys assisted Qualcomm in withholding the critical documents by failing to
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the adequacy of Qualcomm's document
production and by ignoring warnmg signs, which indicated that the document
search was not thorough and that Qualcomm's document production was not
218. Id. at 1247. By June 2007, Qualcomm had "located more than forty-six thousand documents (totaling
more than three hundred thousand pages), which had been requested but not produced in discovery." Qualcomm
111, 2008 WL 66932, at *6.
219. Qualcomm I, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
220. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm IV), No. 05-CV-1958-RMB (BLM), 2007 WL
4351017, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007). At the close of trial, Broadcom moved for sanctions against
Qualcomm for its failure to produce thousands of discovery documents. Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at *1.
221. Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at * 1, *9 n.5.
222. Id. at *3.
223. Id. at *20.
224. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2010 WL 1336937, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
2, 2010) (citing Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at *18-23).
225. Id. (citing Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at * 18-23).
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complete." 2 2 6 This finding pointed out "several inadequacies in Qualcomm's
document search" that in the Magistrate's view "should have been apparent to
outside counsel."22 7 Three such inadequacies stand out: first, "the failure to
search the computers belonging to, or used by, deponents and trial witnesses,"
second, "the failure to adequately investigate when significant, relevant, and
unproduced documents were discovered," and third, "the failure to ensure there
was a legitimate factual basis for the legal arguments made to the Court before
making them." 2 2 8
In reliance on this earlier set of findings, Magistrate Major initially concluded
that "Qualcomm intentionally withheld tens of thousands of emails" and that its
litigation team "assisted, either intentionally or by virtue of acting with reckless
disregard for their discovery obligations, in this discovery violation."2 2 9 That
reckless disregard, she reasoned, enabled Qualcomm's attorneys "to repeatedly
and forcefully make false statements and arguments to the court and jury" in
possible violation of their ethical duties.2 3 0 Accordingly, the Magistrate referred
six members of Qualcomm's litigation team to The State Bar of California for an
investigation of possible ethics rule violations and disciplinary sanctions, and
ordered Qualcomm and the attorneys to participate in a comprehensive Case
Review and Enforcement of Discovery Obligations (CREDO) program.23 1
Subsequently, Qualcomm's attorneys filed objections to the Magistrate's
sanctions order with the trial judge, U.S. District Judge Brewster.23 2 On March 5,
2008, Judge Brewster vacated the Magistrate's order specific to the objector
attorneys and remanded the matter back to the Magistrate, citing the objectors'
"due process right to defend themselves" and reasoning that they "should 'not be
prevented from defending their conduct by the attorney-client privilege of
Qualcomm and its employees and representatives because of the application of
the self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilege of Qualcomm."' 2 3 3
226. Id. (citing Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at *23-3 1).
227. Id. (citing Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at *23-31).
228. Id. (citing Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at *23-31) (commenting that Qualcomm did not appeal its
$8.5 million sanction order).
229. Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at *17-18 ("[T]he Sanctioned Attorneys assisted Qualcomm in
committing this incredible discovery violation by intentionally hiding or recklessly ignoring relevant
documents, ignoring or rejecting numerous warning signs that Qualcomm's document search was inadequate,
and blindly accepting Qualcomm's unsupported assurances that its document search was adequate.").
230. Id. at *18.
231. Id. at *18-19.
232. Qualcornm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2010 WL 1336937, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
2,2010).
233. Id. (quoting U.S. District Judge Brewster). For a discussion of the ethical underpinnings of the
self-defense exception and its rationale, see Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 1
(1998); Roy M. Sobelson, Lawyers, Clients and Assurances of Confidentiality: Lawyers Talking Without
Speaking, Clients Hearing Without Listening, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ErTics 703, 758 (1988). See also Jennifer
Cunningham, Note, Eliminating "Backdoor" Access to Client Confidences: Restricting the Self-Defense
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 992, 992-93 (1990).
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Thereafter, Magistrate Major afforded the objector attorneys "an almost
unlimited opportunity to conduct discovery and to present new facts to the
Court."2 34 During the next fifteen months, the parties to the litigation engaged in
"a massive discovery effort."235 In total, Qualcomm "produced approximately
22,500 documents" extending "well over 100,000 pages" of discovery.236
Additionally, during the remand proceedings, the objector attorneys "deposed
seven Qualcomm engineers, three of Qualcomm's in-house attorneys, two of
Qualcomm's in-house paralegals," and one of the sanctioned attorneys.23 7 Taken
together, these efforts culminated in a three-day evidentiary hearing featuring the
submitted documents, expert opinions, lengthy attorney declarations, and exten-
sive legal arguments.23 8
On April 2, 2010, Magistrate Major issued an order declining to impose
sanctions against the six objector attorneys.23 9 In declining sanctions and
dissolving the court's order to show cause, Magistrate Major expressed "no
doubt" that the "massive discovery failure" at issue "resulted from significant
mistakes, oversights, and miscommunication on the part of both outside counsel
and Qualcomm employees."2 40 The Magistrate explained that "new facts and
evidence presented ... during the remand proceedings revealed ineffective and
problematic interactions between Qualcomm employees and most of the
[objector] Attorneys during the pretrial litigation, including the commission of a
number of critical errors." 2 4' At the same time, the Magistrate emphasized that
such facts and evidence "also revealed that the [objector] Attorneys made
significant efforts to comply with their discovery obligations." 2 4 2 In light of those
efforts, the Magistrate declined to sanction any of the objector attorneys.24 3
From Davis's prescriptive standpoint, the litigation risks at stake in the
Qualcomm discovery process may be attributable to structural and operational
flaws in law firm litigation oversight and discovery management systems, and
perhaps to individual lawyer failures in assessing actual or potential document
relevance. 24 In the Qualcomm case as in the Gellene Bucyrus-Erie bankruptcy
234. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2010 WL 1336937, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
2,2010).
235. Id. Reportedly "Qualcomm searched for, uploaded to its internal review database, and had its outside
counsel review for responsiveness and privilege, over 1.6 million documents." Id.
236. Id.
237. Id
238. Id. at *1-2.
239. Id. at *7.
240. Id. at *2.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id
244. See generally Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional,
Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior
in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 773 (1998).
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restructuring, internal law firm management systems may have given dispropor-
tionate authority to individual associates, paralegals, or partners to make
discovery production decisions without adequate information and independent
review. No doubt good risk management, as conceived by Davis, would have
enabled the Qualcomm law firms to better assist their individual associates,
paralegals, and partners by educating them as to the appropriate rules of
discovery and also as to the potentially adverse consequences that would flow
from a misguided discovery decision. When effectively managed, as gauged by
Davis, such dialogue would have encouraged or even compelled the individual
Qualcomm lawyers to collaborate with their law firms in making fully informed
and ethical discovery judgments. For Davis, those judgments by design would
redound to the individual and collective advantage of the lawyers and law firms
involved in the Qualcomm case.
In spite of these persuasive judgments, Davis's reliance on individual
self-interest and institutional advantage claims, either for the purpose of
exhortation or incentive, perilously echoes the "tournament culture" and "eat
what you kill" ethos dominating the large law firm legal services industry. His
acknowledgement that such an ethos may cause or contribute to law firm risk
management failure suggests that such self-serving reliance may be misplaced.
For Davis, to his credit, good risk management goes beyond technical application
or strict compliance with the legalities of the ethics rules to incorporate the
interests of the public, of clients, and of the spirit of the law. On this broad
measure, the systemic purpose of risk management is to enhance the quality of
ethical decision-making by individual lawyers and law firms. The next Part
considers the enhancement of risk management systems by incorporation of
classical, discretionary, regulatory, and diversity norms in law firm governance,
especially in the evaluation of exclusion and inclusion risks in the partner and
associate hiring, promotion, and retention process.
IV. RISK GOVERNANCE ETHICS
Risk governance ethics link large law firm tournament-directed risk manage-
ment policies to classical, discretionary, regulatory, and diversity traditions of
professionalism. This linkage binds risk assessment and regulation to lawyer
moral discretion and public obligation. Fuller integration of moral and public
precepts into the prescribed risk-based routines of internal controls, external
audits, conflicts of interest protocols, continuing legal education training, and
entry-level and lateral employment enables lawyers and law firms to better
understand the burdens of moral agency, the duties of social responsibility, and
the higher ambitions of professional independence, service, and trust.
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A. CLASSICAL NORMS
Historically, classical norms of fraternity and civic spirit informed the culture
and sociology of large law firm corporate practice. The ideals defined lawyer
character and conduct in terms of wisdom, prudence, and craft-like virtuosity,
and celebrated lawyer public leadership and law firm civic-mindedness. The
individual and institutional misconduct of Gellene and Milbank, and to a lesser
extent the conduct in Kelley Drye and perhaps Qualcomm, offend the classical
norms of professionalism espoused by leading academics in legal education and
ethics, notably Anthony Kronman, Robert Cover, and Tom Shaffer. Kronman's
vision of classical norms urges the public virtue and wisdom of the lawyer-
statesman acting within the traditions of the prevailing legal order.2 4 5 Cover's
vision of normative diversity and dialogue embraces the voices of outsider
ethical communities silenced by the traditions of the dominant legal order.24 6
Shaffer's vision of faith and community-affirming spirituality encourages moral
dialogue subversive of the dominant order and its traditions.24 7
Kronman's classical vision of the lawyer-statesman invokes a sense of civic
trusteeship in the custodial work of conserving past professional ideals.2 48 That
craft-like work cultivates a quality of lawyer judgment embodied in technical
virtuosity and manifested in practical wisdom and prudence. 24 9 Craft-like
activity, for example, in transactions, discovery, or firm governance, infuses
professional life with personal meaning and connotes a special talent for
leadership that coincides with the public good. 25 0 Kronman's classical lawyers
possess a superior ability to discern the public good and to preserve law and
community. Their integrity and fraternity, expressed in the arts of compassion,
affectionate good will, and civic friendship, interweave the means-ends calcula-
tions of client representation with larger prudential considerations and other-
regarding interests of the law and the legal order.25 1 Common law traditions of
prudentialism and craft in the service of the public good restore the role of the
lawyer as a moral agent called to the law as a profession and renews the moral
capacity for the ends-oriented judgments of third party and public deliberation.2 52
245. See ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
246. See Cover, supra note 75, at 4-44.
247. See Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1932-33. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer,
Towering Figures, Enigmas, and Responsive Communities in American Legal Ethics, 51 ME. L. REv. 229
(1999).
248. See KRONMAN, supra note 245, at 11-17.
249. Alfieri, The Fall ofLegal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1927; see KRONMAN, supra note 245, at 15-16.
250. See KRONMAN, supra note 245, at 14-15.
251. See id. at 99-100.
252. See Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1927-30. See generally KRONMAN, supra note
245, at 14-17.
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Cover echoes Kronman's classical valuation of the profession as a civic calling
with intrinsic rewards and satisfactions, as well as his treatment of legal ethics as
a reservoir of group or community norms.2 53 Yet, for Cover, ethics rules stem
from moral community, not simply the laws and customs of a prevailing legal
order. That community or nomos reflects the tension between the reality of a
dominant normative order and a competing vision of diverse ethical commit-
ments and contested narratives.25 4 Cover's preference for normative diffusion
and dialogue permits polycentric norms of moral diversity to thrive.255
Shaffer connects Cover's vision of community-based norm articulation and
moral aspiration to justice and religious faith.2 56 Shaffer views religious norms as
a source of moral responsibility and spirituality realized in relation to others and
in engagement with community. Responsive moral community "entails both
self-alteration and context-transcendence" in relationships of communion that
value others outside the client-lawyer relationship.25 7 To reconcile client
individual rights and lawyer social responsibilities, Shaffer joins Kronman in
imagining lawyers as custodians of community, compassion, and conscience in
dialogue with clients about the common good, a dialogue absent from the instant
case studies.258
Classical norms of the common good inform discovery and the assessment of
litigation risk. In discovery, the common good is bound up in the notion of candor
in communication with clients, courts, and adversaries. Consider in this respect
Magistrate Major's ultimate decision to decline attorney sanctions in the
Qualcomm litigation and the underlined importance of managing communication
risk in discovery. Indeed, the Magistrate's decision usefully summarized "the
major errors" in lawyer-client communication "contributing to the massive cache
of critical documents remaining undiscovered by [the objector] Attorneys and
unproduced by Qualcomm until after trial." 2 5 9 For the Magistrate, the "fundamen-
tal problem" in the Qualcomm litigation "was an incredible breakdown in
communication."260
253. See generally Cover, supra note 75.
254. See id. at 9.
255. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1932. See generally Cover, supra note 75.
256. See Alfieri, The Fall ofLegal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1932-33. See generally Shaffer, supra note 247.
257. Alfieri, The Fall ofLegal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1932-33.
258. See id. at 33; see also Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of
Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L.
REv. 411 (2005); W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in
Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1955 (2001).
259. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cvl958-B (BLM), 2010 WL 1336937, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
2,2010).
260. Id.
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In findings of fact, Magistrate Major observed that a "lack of meaningful
communication permeated all of the relationships (amongst Qualcomm employ-
ees ... between Qualcomm employees and outside legal counsel, and amongst
outside counsel) and contributed to all of the other failures."2 61 For example, no
evidence was adduced "establishing that either in-house lawyers or outside
counsel met in person with the appropriate Qualcomm engineers (those who were
likely to have been involved in the conduct at issue and who were likely to be
witnesses) at the beginning of the case to explain the legal issues and discuss
appropriate document collection."2 62 Equally important, Magistrate Major
explained, "no attorney took supervisory responsibility for verifying that the
necessary discovery had been conducted .. . and that the resulting discovery
supported the important legal arguments, claims, and defenses being presented to
the court." 263
To Magistrate Major, repeated "fundamental failures" in communication "led
to the discovery violations" in the Qualcomm litigation. 26 Even more troubling
for risk management purposes, the Magistrate found that the "failures were
exacerbated by an incredible lack of candor on the part of the principal
Qualcomm employees."26 5 Magistrate Major opined that "this lack of candor was
not limited to ... just the Qualcomm engineers." 2 6 6 Such widespread lack of
candor persisted despite the objector attorneys' continual attempts "to determine
whether Qualcomm had participated in the JVT proceedings during the time the
H.264 standard was being developed,"26 7 and despite their recurring questioning
261. Id.
262. Id. The Magistrate noted:
[O]utside counsel did not obtain sufficient information from any source to understand how
Qualcomm's computer system is organized: where emails are stored, how often and to what location
laptops and personal computers are backed up, whether, when and under what circumstances data
from laptops are copied into repositories, what type of information is contained within the various
databases and repositories, what records are maintained regarding the search for, and collection of,
documents for litigation, etc.
Id.
263. Id. at *2-3 (noting "a lack of agreement amongst the participants regarding responsibility for document
collection and production").
264. Id. at *2. Magistrate Major pointed to both communication and related delegation errors committed by
the litigation team, in-house lawyers, and paralegals in promulgating and implementing collection guidelines
regulating database and computer searches, including potential search locations and custodians. Id. at *3
(citations omitted).
265. Id. at *4.
266. Id. (commenting that "a number of Qualcomm employees, including legal counsel, knew that
Qualcomm had analyzed the H.264 standard and had attended JVT meetings during the relevant time period and
yet no one informed Responding Attorneys").
267. Id. (noting that the sanctioned attorneys "received confirmation by fifteen Qualcomm employees,
including lawyers, on thirty-one occasions that Qualcomm did not participate in JVT or that the same was
probably or almost certainly correct").
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of "Qualcomm employees about Qualcomm's alleged participation."2 68
The consequences of this "pervasive miscommunication and incomplete
document search," Magistrate Major declared, "were compounded by an
inadequate follow-up in response to contradictory, or potentially contradictory
evidence." 2 6 9 The Magistrate remarked, for example,- "neither in-house nor
outside counsel ensured that the identified employees' computers were searched
for relevant documents and emails." 2 7 0 Absent supervisory follow-up, she added,
"when the twenty-one emails were found on [a] computer during trial, none of the
attorneys considered the fact that the discovery of the 'new' emails proved
Qualcomm's document collection and production had been inadequate," or
"reviewed the discovery production log to determine the scope of the document
collection and production, or otherwise reflected on the state of the discovery or
its application to trial arguments." 2 7 ' As a result, Magistrate Major found, "some
of the interrogatory responses were not accurate and the document productions
were not complete," even though the "discovery responses were made after a
reasonable, although flawed, inquiry and were not without substantial justifica-
tion."272
Magistrate Major's findings clarify that the objector attorneys "did not act in
bad faith" in spite of "a number of poor decisions." 2 73 These findings
demonstrate that the objector attorneys "did make repeated efforts to verify that
Qualcomm's discovery responses were accurate," even if they "did not pursue
several discovery paths that seem obvious, at least in hindsight." 2 74 Likewise, the
findings show "numerous, reasonable steps to verify the truth of [witness]
statements."2 75 The findings also establish that the objector attorneys "them-
selves acknowledge that it was a mistake" in judgment "not to produce the
twenty-one emails discovered during trial."276
Despite these elucidating findings, Magistrate Major pointed out that "no one
suggested that any follow-up discovery investigation be conducted." 2 7 7 Further-
more, the Magistrate added, "none of the attorneys considered how the 'new'
[email] documents affected the arguments being presented during trial." 2 7 8 To the
extent that the objector attorneys "should have considered the contents of the
268. Id. (mentioning that "five third-parties, including the chair of the JVT and a Broadcom employee
involved in the JVT proceedings, confirmed their belief that Qualcomm was not involved with JVT during
development of the H.264 standard").
269. Id. at *5.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at *6.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at *7 (citations omitted).
277. Id.
278. Id.
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documents and their relevance to the arguments being presented in court and to
the adequacy of the discovery process," nevertheless, she found that their
decision "to withhold the twenty-one emails as non-responsive was not made in
bad faith." 279 Hence, Magistrate Major concluded that while "some" of the
objector attorneys made "significant errors," the remand proceedings produced
"insufficient evidence to prove that any of the [objector] Attorneys engaged in the
requisite 'bad faith' or that [any one of the objector attorneys] failed to make a
reasonable inquiry before certifying Qualcomm's discovery responses." 2 8 0 For
these reasons, the Magistrate declined to impose sanctions on the objector
attorneys and dissolved the order to show cause that initiated the court's sanction
proceedings.
The Qualcomm sanction proceedings well illustrate the individual lawyer,
institutional law firm, and in-house corporate challenges of managing communi-
cation risk in complex litigation-related discovery. That risk increases when an
individual lawyer or paralegal on a litigation team decides not to produce a
relevant, non-privileged document and not to notify an appropriate law firm or
in-house supervisor of his decision, whether the decision ultimately proves to be
right or wrong. In the same way, that risk increases when a litigation team as a
whole loses sight of "the larger discovery picture" in a case.282
The structure of deniability in large law firm organizations screens individuals-
partners, associates, and paralegals-from liability for ethical misdeeds when
they act at a distance and when they act under imperfect information. The ability
to avoid acknowledging affirmative screening actions and unwitting misdeeds
protects lawyers from unwanted knowledge, for example, of discovery errors or
omissions. Recall that for Luban, ignorance obtained from wrongfully screening
against guilty knowledge is itself blameworthy. On this valence, both the
wrongful screening action and the unwitting misdeed share blame, implying a
principal-agent complicity when the lawyer-as-agent ratifies the screening
decision of the lawyer-as-principal to avoid guilty knowledge.
To Luban and others, law firm complicity in ethical misconduct arises out of
willful institutional ignorance of inconvenient knowledge and a related lack of
candor among individual partners and associates. As before, both forms of ethical
opacity raise issues of integrity and dissonance for individual lawyers, their law
firms, and the clients they purport to serve in litigation advocacy and transac-
tional counseling. They also signal the absence of moral leadership inside and
outside the law firm itself.2 8 3 As the Qualcomm case study shows, the individual
279. Id.
280. Id.
28 1. See id.
282. Id.
283. On lawyers and moral leadership, see Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers and Leadership, 20 PROF. LAw. 1, 1
(2010) (citing the "leadership deficit" in the legal profession); Deborah L. Rhode, Where is the Leadership in
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and institutional failure to address such issues, in this case the management of
communication risk in discovery, shifts investigation and resolution to courts,
however functionally ill-equipped and normatively unsuited they may be for that
managerial task. Turn next to an assessment of discretionary and regulatory
norms.
B. DISCRETIONARY AND REGULATORY NORMS
Discretionary norms seek to enhance lawyer accountability by relying on the
resources of the law itself-legality and justice. Simon's carefully elaborated
justice-seeking version of discretion in lawyering tailors purposive and practical
judgments to refuse legally permissible courses of action and to rebuff potentially
enforceable legal claims.2 8 4 Such judgments turn on an assessment of relative
merit internal and external to the representation. Simon links reconciliation of
competing client and third-party goals to the traditional ambition of the
lawyering process defined by direct lawyer participation in not only the
elaboration, but also the implementation, of legality and justice.2 85 Participation
requires independence from client goals and established laws sufficient to
vindicate legal merit and justice in a particular case.2 86
Discretion confers direct responsibility on the lawyer for both substantive
merit and procedural form. The purpose and form of procedure molds the broad
and narrow framing of an issue-for example, conflicts of interest, discovery
disclosure, or law firm diversity-consistent with interpretive plausibility and
good faith.2 8 7 Gellene's lack of good faith in the Bucyrus-Erie bankruptcy,
coupled with his weak commitment to the norms of legality and justice, undercut
the legitimacy of his discretionary judgments of internal merit and goal selection
in bankruptcy counseling and litigation, and hence, breached his deliberative and
fiduciary duties. 2 8 8 The misjudgments, here "induced by tournament competi-
tion, corporate practice insularity, and transactional team allegiance," warrant
consideration of compliance-enforcing regulatory norms.28 9
Regulatory norms based on compliance-enforcing procedures may be inte-
Moral Leadership?, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND POLICY 4
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006) (discussing leadership, inspiration, and relationships). See generally Ben W.
Heineman, Jr., Lawyers as Leaders, 116 YALE. L.J. POCKET PART 266 (2007); HERB RUBENSTEIN, LEADERSHIP FOR
LAWYERS (2000).
284. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1940-41.
285. Id. at 1941. See generally William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083
(1988); Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About Professionalism: Core Values, Legality, and Corporate
Law Practice, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1067 (2007).
286. See Alfieri, The Fall ofLegal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1940-41; Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,
supra note 285, at 1090-113. See generally Whelan, supra note 285.
287. See Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 285, at 1096-113.
288. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1942.
289. Id. at 1944 (citing REGAN, supra note 6, at 37-41, 298).
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grated into the infrastructure of law firm organization, as Davis shows, chiefly
through the appointment of full-time in-house ethics advisers, the designation of
in-house partner liaisons to consult with firm malpractice insurance carriers, and
the implementation of interactive ethics training programs for lawyers and
administrative staff. To be effective, again as Davis prescribes, these programs
and procedures must inculcate an organization-wide culture of compliance with
attendant organizational leadership. All require institutional resources, open
communication and access to information, independent auditors, supervision and
monitoring, and compensation-compliance linkage.29 0
Regan ties compliance-enforcing procedures and organizational values-
accountability to corporate enterprises and corporate law firms committed to the
internal regulation of specialized practice groups and teams. 2 9 ' For Regan and to
a substantial extent Davis, such regulation vests responsibility for compliance
measures in entities or industries themselves within targeted fields of technical
292 Mr pc
expertise. More specifically, it confers responsibility upon specialists working
in cooperation with a firm-designated practice group ethics partner or a firm-wide
ethics committee in joint assessment, deliberation, and implementation.2 9 3 Such
discretionary and regulatory norms work to revive the traditional ambitions of
legality and justice in professionalism.
Both discretionary and regulatory norms prove useful in governing discovery
obligations. Consider, for example, Judge Major's now vacated 2008 order
directing Qualcomm and its attorneys to participate in a comprehensive Case
Review and Enforcement of Discovery Obligations program for instructive
lessons in managing discovery obligations.29 4 In particular, Judge Major's
referral to the CREDO program links the larger legal services marketplace
"decline in and deterioration of civility, professionalism and ethical conduct" in
complex litigation to Davis's process-oriented risk management compliance para-
digm.29 5 Specific to mixed ethical and discovery obligations, the CREDO program
protocol adopts compliance-enforcing mechanisms common to Davis's regula-
tory scheme. Consider the following cluster of shared commonalities.
290. See id. at 1947-48.
291. See REGAN, supra note 6, at 358-61.
292. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1949. See generally REGAN, supra note 6, at 358-66;
David B. Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers?-Managing Conflict and Context
in Professional Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 465 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L. REv. 799 (1992).
293. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 1949.
294. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2010 WL 1336937, at *7 n.13 (S.D.
Cal. Apr. 2, 2010) (noting that the remand proceedings served the intended function of the CREDO program
referral in the original sanction order).
295. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm III), No. 05cvI958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *20
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), vacated in part, No. 05cv1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
2008).
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The CREDO program requires "identifying the factors that contributed to the
discovery violation," for example, insufficient communication, inadequate case
management, and inadequate discovery plans.296 Davis's risk management
protocol emphasizes lawyer-to-lawyer, lawyer-to-firm, and lawyer-to-client
communication, case docket and calendar supervision, and internal oversight.2 97
The CREDO program also entails "creating and evaluating proposals, proce-
dures, and processes that will correct the deficiencies identified in" case
management. 298 Davis's protocol implements similar internal controls. So, too,
the CREDO program involves "developing and finalizing a comprehensive
protocol that will prevent future discovery violations., 2 9 9 Davis's protocol
stresses loss prevention. Furthermore, the CREDO program extends the applica-
tion of discovery protocol broadly to multiple factual situations, for example,
"when the client does not have corporate counsel, when the client has a single
in-house lawyer, when the client has a large legal staff, and when there are two
law firms representing one client."30 0 Davis's protocol exhibits the same
elasticity. Lastly, the CREDO program necessitates "identifying and evaluating
data tracking systems, software, or procedures that corporations could implement
to better enable inside and outside counsel to identify potential sources of
discoverable documents (e.g., the correct databases, archives, etc.)."3 0 1 Davis's
protocol employs technology management systems and procedures for calendars,
dockets, document destruction and retention, and discovery.0 2
In addition to the common risk management functions of communication,
internal control, loss prevention, flexibility, and tracking, both the CREDO
program and Davis's compliance paradigm demand good faith. By intent, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require parties to conduct discovery in good
296. Id. at *19 (footnote omitted).
297. See Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 101--02, 105, 115; DAVIS & JARVIS,
supra note 24, at 15-20.
298. Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at *19.
- 299. Id. The CREDO comprehensive protocol dictates:
determining the depth and breadth of case management and discovery plans that should be adopted;
identifying by experience or authority the attorney from the retained counsel's office who should
interface with the corporate counsel and on which issties; describing the frequency the attorneys
should meet and whether other individuals should participate in the communications; identifying who
should participate in the development of the case management and discovery plans; describing and
evaluating various methods of resolving conflicts and disputes between the client and retained
counsel, especially relating to the adequacy of discovery searches; describing the type, nature,
frequency, and participants in case management and discovery meetings; and, suggesting required
ethical and discovery training; etc.
Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management, supra note 11, at 105; DAVIS & JARVIS, supra note 24, at
16.
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faith.303 In the electronic age, Judge Major in Qualcomm from the outset
reported, the operation of a good faith discovery system compels attorneys and
clients to "work together to ensure that both understand how and where electronic
documents, records and emails are maintained and to determine how best to
locate, review, and produce responsive documents."3 " Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, she remarked, "[a]ttomeys must take responsibility for
ensuring that their clients conduct a comprehensive and appropriate document
search."3 05 That responsibility requires individual attorney and collective law
firm management accountability.
Like the conduct of Gellene and Milbank in the Bucyrus-Erie bankruptcy and
the de-equitization policy in the Kelley Drye suit, the discovery process in the
Qualcomm litigation shows the inadequacy of Davis's risk management para-
digm, particularly when applied to internal law firm and external lawyer-client
communication and collaboration. No legal services management paradigm, of
course, will fully restrain rogue partners like John Gellene, tournament-based
compensation systems, or litigation teams locked in adversarial combat, espe-
cially when litigation clients turn hostile and untrustworthy. And no management
paradigm will fully exert command and control over complex discovery. Also no
paradigm will rescue institutions riven by tournament competition over profits
and productivity.
To check the aggressive advocacy of modern corporate litigation, lawyers, law
firms, and courts must go beyond risk management paradigms and CREDO
programs to reinvigorate the classical norms of fraternity and civic spirit that
once informed the culture and sociology of large law firm practice. Those
classical norms guided lawyer character and conduct by the lights of wisdom,
prudence, and craft-like virtuosity, and honored lawyer public leadership and law
firm civic-mindedness in action. Espoused variously by Kronman, Cover, and
Shaffer, the norms celebrated public virtue and moral dialogue inside and outside
the traditions of the legal order. Such traditions-civic trusteeship, technical
virtuosity, practical wisdom, prudence, and integrity-affirm the lawyer's role as
a moral agent and his capacity to engage in moral judgment that transcends
private self-interest and institutional advantage. Consider next the content of
diversity norms and the form of exclusionlinclusion risks in law firm workplace
Management.
303. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note (1983 Amendment) ("If primary responsibility for
conducting discovery is to continue to rest with the litigants, they must be obliged to act responsibly and avoid
abuse."), available at http://www.law.comell.edu/rules/frcp/ACRule26.htm.
304. Qualcomm III, 2008 WL 66932, at *9-10 ("Qualcomm has not presented any evidence attempting to
explain or justify its failure to produce the documents." (emphasis in original)).
305. Id. at *9.
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C. DIVERSITY NORMS AND EXCLUSION/INCLUSION RISKS
Davis's linkage of compliance norms to private self-interest and law firm
profitability imperatives, and his capacious model of risk regulation, together
permit the treatment of diversity as a structural and nonstructural risk factor in the
governance of large law firms. Appropriate to its breadth and its variation across
race,30 6 gender,o7 age,30 s and disability,3 0 9 the regulation of workplace diversity
generates a wide range of management paradigms,310 practices,311 and perfor-
mance effects.3 12 Both the economic determinants of diversity31 3 and its complex
organizational setting314 spur overt and covert workplace resistance.3 15 Overcom-
ing workplace resistance in large law firms or in other institutional contexts, for
example, in higher education,3 16 requires a climate or culture of diversity as well
as a character-based ethos of diversity.317 The identification and assessment of
exclusion and inclusion risks in the workplace of the modem multistate and
multinational law firm shape the cultural climate and institutional character of
diversity, including its normative underpinnings.
306. See generally David A. Thomas & Suzy Wetlaufer, A Question of Color: A Debate on Race in the U.S.
Workplace, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 118.
307. See generally Claude Francoeur et al., Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance and Top
Management, 81 J. Bus. ETHICs 83 (2008); Joan Magretta, Will She Fit In?, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at
18.
308. See generally Jerry W. Hedge, Walter C. Borman, & Steven E. Lammlein, Organizational Strategies for
Attracting, Utilizing, and Retaining Older Workers, in JERRY W. HEDGE, WALTER C. BORMAN & STEVEN E.
LAMMLEIN, THE AGING WORKFORCE: REALITIES, MYTHS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONS 115-35 (2006).
309. See generally Fredrick Muyia Nafukho et al., Disability as a Diversity Factor: Implications for Human
Resource Practices, 12 ADVANCEs DEVELOPING HuM. RESOURCES 395 (2010), available at http://adh.sagepub.com/
content/12/4/395.
310. See generally Marlene Morrison et al., Diversity and Diversity Management: Messages from Recent
Research, 34 EDUC. MGMT. ADMIN. & LEADERSHIP 277 (2006), available at http://ema.sagepub.com/content/34/
3/277; David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigmfor Managing Diversity,
HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 79.
311. See generally Yang Yang & Alison M. Konrad, Understanding Diversity Management Practices:
Implications ofInstitutional Theory and Resource-Based Theory, 36 GROUP & ORG. MGMT.6 (2011).
312. See generally Nigel Bassett-Jones, The Paradox of Diversity Management, Creativity and Innovation,
14 CREAIVITY & INNOVAION MGMT. 169 (2005), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-
8691.00337.x/pdf; Mary Kwak, The Paradoxical Effects ofDiversity, 44 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 7 (2003).
313. See generally Vera Djordjevich, Law Firms' Diversity Progress Stalls in Recession, NAT'L L. REv.
(Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.natlawreview.com/articlellaw-firm-diversity-progress-stalls-recession; O'Kelly E.
McWilliams IH & Nimesh M. Patel, Diversity Management in An Economic Downturn, Bus. L. TODAY,
Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 59-61, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2009-01-02/mcwilliams.shtml.
314. See generally Lynn M. Shore et al., Diversity in Organizations: Where Are We Now and Where Are We
Going?, 19 HuM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 117 (2009).
315. See generally Kecia M. Thomas & Victoria C. Plaut, The Many Faces of Diversity Resistance in the
Workplace, in DIVERSITY RESISTANCE IN ORGANIZATIONS 1, 1-22 (Kecia M. Thomas ed., 2008).
316. See William G. Bowen et al., A Report Card on Diversity: Lessons for Business from Higher Education,
HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 139.
317. See Andrew 0. Herdman & Amy McMillan-Capehart, Establishing a Diversity Program Is Not
Enough: Exploring the Determinants ofDiversity Climate, 25 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 39 (2010).
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1. DIVERSITY NoRMs
Diversity norms encompass multiple categories of identity-based differences
spanning gender,318 race and ethnicity,31 9 and other varied cultural differences. 3 2 0
Adapted to the dictates of Big Law firm management,3 21 the norms necessarily
skew toward marketplace performance3 2 2 in a global economy.3 2 3 Yet, they also
acknowledge the complex psychology of diversity management3 24 and the
cross-cultural dynamics of intergroup conflict. 3 2 5 Moreover, they concede the
management limits of diversity training, pipeline and outreach programs, and
network and affinity groups for women and minorities in the legal profession.3 26
The acknowledgement of diversity management limits and the admission that
standard leadership and outreach may prove insufficient to promote equal
opportunity, equity, and diversity effectively causes many scholars of the legal
profession, here Deborah Rhode32 7 and Eli Wald,328 to endorse diversity
initiatives that combine both conventional (mentoring programs) and innovative
(oversight structures) strategies of law firm accountability, monitoring, and
information sharing. For Rhode and others,329 these strategies of organizational
management must be founded on a firm-wide culture of commitment and
318. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Difference "Difference" Makes, in THE DIFFERENCE "DIFFER-
ENCE" MAKES: WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP 3-50 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2003); Patricia H. Werhane et al., Women
Leaders in Corporate America: A Study ofLeadership Values and Methods, in 1 GENDER, RACE, AND ETHNICY
IN THE WORKPLACE 1-29 (Margaret F. Karsten ed., 2006).
319. See generally NILDA CHONG & FRANCIA BAEz, LATINO CULTURE: A DYNAMIC FORCE IN THE CHANGING
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005); Elizabeth H. Gorman & Fiona M. Kay, Racial and Ethnic Minority
Representation in Large U.S. Law Firms, in STUDIES IN LAW, supra note 76, at 211, 232-35.
320. See generally Taylor Cox, Jr., CREATING THE MULTICULTURAL ORGANIZATION: A STRATEGY FOR
CAPTURING THE POWER OF DIVERSITY (2001); GEORGE HENDERSON, CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE WORKPLACE:
ISSUES AND STRATEGIES (1994); JACK SCARBOROUGH, THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THEIR IMPACT
ON MANAGEMENT (1998).
321. See generally HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON MANAGING DIVERSITY (2001).
322. See Kevin Campbell & Antonio Minguez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial
Performance, 83 J. Bus. ETHICS 435 (2008).
323. See generally CEIA DE ANCA & ANTONIO VAZQUEZ, MANAGING DIVERSYTY IN THE GLOBAL ORGANIZA-
TION: CREATING NEW BUSINESS VALUES (2007); David B. Wilkins, Why Global Law Finns Should Care About
Diversity: Five Lessons from the American Experience, 2 EUR. J. L. REFORM 415 (2000).
324. See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF WORKPLACE DIVERSITY (Margaret S. Stockdale &
Faye J. Crosby eds., 2004).
325. See generally ELLA L. J. EDMONDSON BELL & STELLA M. NKOMO, OUR SEPARATE WAYS: BLACK AND
WHITE WOMEN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY (2001); JOSEPH W. WEISS, ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR AND CHANGE: MANAGING DIVERSITY, CROSS-CULTURAL DYNAMICS, AND ETHICS (2001); Robin J. Ely &
David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity Perspectives on Work Group Processes
and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229 (2001).
326. See generally Rhode, Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, supra note 10, at 1069-72.
327. See id. at 1071-75.
328. See Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession or Who is
Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079, 1115-18 (2011).
329. See David A. Thomas, Diversity as Strategy, HARV. BUS. REv., Sept. 2004, at 98.
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likewise sustained by a shared character of inclusion. 3 30 To the extent that law
firms' risk management strategies explicitly or implicitly gauge exclusion and
inclusion risks in their organizational governance of diversity independent of
culture and character, however, equal opportunity and equity will be jeopardized.
Consider the assessment of exclusion risks in diversity management.
2. EXCLUSION RISKS
Exclusion risks constitute important structural and nonstructural variables in
Big Law workplace diversity. Structural risk management mechanisms, for
example, recruitment and mentoring committees, seek to control those variables
through procedures regulating hiring, promotion, and retention. Nonstructural
deep governance norms, for example, equal opportunity commitments, seek to
channel those same variables through the construction of law firm character and
culture. Six exclusion risks stand out in modem law firm employment practices:
labor pool contraction, social capital erosion, revenue loss, institutional succes-
sion disruption, human capital attrition, and litigation or settlement cost.
The first exclusion risk concerns labor pool contraction. Law firm labor pools
fill from entry-level and lateral migration streams. Exclusion, by narrowing or
obstructing those eligibility streams, restricts the diversity of the available labor
pool for entry-level and lateral recruitment.3 3 '
A second exclusion risk involves social capital erosion. Social capital in law
and legal systems accrues from bar, bench, and related civic or community
sources. Exclusion relinquishes social capital, whether defined in terms of gender
diversity332 or racial integration,3 3 3 and surrenders the bar and bench leadership
that accompanies it.3 3 4
A third exclusion risk concerns revenue loss.3 35 Revenue depends on firm
336 maret7
performance, or more specifically team performance, and market competi-
330. See Rhode, Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, supra note 10, at 1076-77.
331. See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law
Firms?An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 493 (1996); see also Note, "Trading Action forAccess:" The
Myth of Meritocracy and the Failure to Remedy Structural Discrimination, 121 HARV. L. REv. 2156, 2177
(2008).
332. See generally Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J.
55 (2009).
333. See generally Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal", supra note 157, at 1554 n.34 (noting
"significant differences between the experiences of, and opportunities available to, black, Asian, and Hispanic
lawyers-and between each of these groups and the situation confronted by white women").
334. See Jacky Lumby, Conceptualizing Diversity and Leadership: Evidence from 10 Cases, 34 EDUC.
MGMT. ADMIN. & LEADERSHP 151 (2006), available at http://ema.sagepub.com/content/34/2/151.
335. For a skeptical account of the business case for diversity, see Rhode, Diversity and Gender Equity in
Law Firms, supra note 10, at 1060-64.
336. See generally Sean Dwyer et al., Gender Diversity in Management and Firm Performance: The
Influence of Growth Orientation and Organizational Culture, 56 J. Bus. REs. 1009 (2003); Luis R.
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tion.3 38 Exclusion carries performance costs3 39 and produces skill deficiencies, 3 4 0
in spite of intra-group or inter-group workplace conflict. 34 1 Revenue losses and
performance costs rise when firms fail to satisfy the diversity mandates of
corporations or the integration demands of client management teams.3 42
A fourth exclusion risk pertains to institutional succession disruption. Institu-
tional succession involves leadership development, 343 the cultivation of "organi-
zational citizenship,"4 and forward-looking, sequential planning." 5 Firm longevity
and profitability hinge on such strategic planning. Exclusion curtails leadership
options and inhibits succession planning, thus endangering firm longevity.
A fifth exclusion risk relates to human capital attrition and replacement cost.
Law firm human capital is bound up in organizational culture,3 4 6 Commitment, 3 4 7
and key competencies.348 Replacement cost is measured by the dual expense of
G6mez-Mejia & Leslie E. Palich, Cultural Diversity and the Performance of Multinational Firms, 28 J. INT'L
Bus. STUD. 309 (1997); Orlando C. Richard et al., Cultural Diversity in Management, Firm Performance, and
the Moderating Role of Entrepreneurial Orientation Dimensions, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 255 (2004); Orlando C.
Richard, Racial Diversity, Business Strategy, and Firm Performance: A Resource-Based View, 43 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 164 (2000) [hereinafter Richard, Racial Diversity]; Quinetta M. Roberson & Hyeon Jeong Park, Examining
the Link Between Diversity and Firm Performance: The Effects of Diversity Reputation and Leader Racial
Diversity, 32 GROuP & ORG. MGMT. 548 (2007).
337. See generally Robert L. Lattimer, The Case for Diversity in Global Business, and the Impact of
Diversity on Team Performance, 8 CoMPETIVENEss REv., no. 2, 1998 at 32.
338. See generally Donald C. Hambrick et al., The Influence of Top Management Team Heterogeneity on
Firms' Competitive Moves, 41 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 659 (1996).
339. See generally Richard, Racial Diversity, supra note 336; Orlando C. Richard et al., The Impact of
Racial Diversity on Intermediate and Long-Term Performance: The Moderating Role of Environmental
Context, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1213 (2007); Marie-tldne Roberge & Rolf van Dick, Recognizing the Benefits
of Diversity: When and How Does Diversity Increase Group Performance?, 20 HUM. REsOuRCE MGMT. REV.
295 (2010).
340. See Helen Turnbull et al., Diversity and Inclusion in Organizations: Developing an Instrument for
Identification of Skill Deficiencies, 14 PRoc. ACAD. ORG. CULTURE, COMM. & CONFLICT 28 (2009), available at
http://www.alliedacademies.org/public/Proceedings/Proceedings24/AOCCC%20Proceedings.pdf#page=32.
341. See Lisa Hope Pelled et al., Exploring the Black Box: An Analysis of Work Group Diversity, Conflict,
and Performance, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1999).
342. See Cedric Herring, Does Diversity Pay?: Race, Gender and the Business Case for Diversity, 74 AM.
Soc. REv. 208, 219-20 (2009); Stanley F. Slater et al., The Business Case for Commitment to Diversity, 51 Bus.
HORIZONs 201, 205-08 (2008).
343. See Eddy S.W. Ng, Why Organizations Choose to Manage Diversity? Toward a Leadership-Based
Theoretical Framework, 7 Hum. REsOURCE DEv. REv. 58, 70-73 (2008), available at http://hrd.sagepub.com/
content/7/l/58.full.pdf+html.
344. See Roberto Concepcion Jr., Organizational Citizenship Through Talent Management: An Alternative
Framework to Diversity in Private Practice, 42 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 43 (2008).
345. See Marcia P. Shannon, A Short Course in Succession Planning, 37 LAw PRACTICE 32, 36 (May-June
2011).
346. See generally R. L. Kimbrough & P. J. Componation, The Relationship Between Organizational Culture
and Enterprise Risk Management, ENGINEERING MGMT. J., June 2009, at 18.
347. See generally Liora Findler et al., The Challenge of Workforce Management in a Global Society:
Modeling the Relationship Between Diversity, Inclusion, Organizational Culture, and Employee Well-Being,
Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment, 31 ADMIN. Soc. WORK, no. 3, 2007 at 63.
348. See William D. Henderson, Law Firm Strategies for Human Capital: Past, Present, Future, in STUDIES
IN LAW, supra note 76, at 73, 97- 100.
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recruitment and training. Early lawyer departure, induced by diversity-based
disaffection and the lack of a critical mass of diverse partners or associates,
imposes high replacement costs. Exclusion, even when only partial, increases the
likelihood of early lawyer departure through attrition or lateral migration and
heightens the recurrent cost of recruitment and training.
A sixth exclusion risk touches on litigation or settlement cost. Litigation cost
may be registered internally, through lost business opportunity, or externally,
through third party fee payment. Settlement cost may be measured by lost profit
or capital contribution and investment. Exclusion increases the probability and
accrued cost of defending against employment discrimination suits in hiring and
promotion. By contrast, consider the risks and costs of inclusion.
3. INCLUSION RISKS
Inclusion risks similarly comprise key variables in Big Law workplace
diversity. Structural risk management mechanisms and nonstructural deep
governance norms both seek to mitigate or temper those variables in regulating
the character, culture, and outcomes of law firm hiring, promotion, and retention.
Six inclusion risks garner attention in modern law firms: labor pool dilution,
social cohesion and branding depletion, client rejection and revenue diminution,
operational inefficiency, accommodation price escalation, and litigation cost.
The first inclusion risk concerns labor pool expansion. Pool expansion may
occur at entry-level and lateral points of access. Such access may be driven by
pipeline and outreach programs. Inclusion of these sorts increases the cost of
recruiting a more diverse labor force at both points of access and, at the same
time, intensifies the fear of labor pool dilution.34 9
A second inclusion risk involves law firm social cohesion and branding
depletion. Inclusion threatens firm collegiality and fraternity, and by extension,
the stature of a firm within historically segregated or stratified bar, bench, and
civic circles. Fueled by network or affinity groups, such inclusion may incite
backlash, especially when the affected firm lacks an organizational commitment
to diversity in both the character and culture of the institution. 5 o
A third inclusion risk pertains to client rejection and revenue diminution.
Inclusion tempts dissembling or prevaricating styles of client rebuff motivated by
a distaste for or an objection to diversity initiatives in established and emerging
markets.35  Client rejection of an individual lawyer on diversity grounds, and the
349. See Stephen B. Knouse, Targeted Recruiting for Diversity: Strategy, Impression Management, Realistic
Expectations, and Diversity Climate, 26 INr'L J. MGMT. 347 (2009).
350. Rhode, Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, supra note 10, at 1053-56; see also Patrick F.
McKay & Derek R. Avery, Warning! Diversity Recruitment Could Backfire, 14 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 330 (2005).
351. See Douglas A. Ready et a]., Winning the Race for Talent in Emerging Markets, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.
2008, at 62.
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consequent dismissal of the affiliated law firm, results in a loss of revenue and
market share.
A fourth inclusion risk relates to operational inefficiency. Inclusion demands
alternative arrangements, such as race- or gender-based mentoring, monitoring,
and information sharing systems, that may detract from institutional efficiency
and productivity. Although such inclusive systems may advance internal fairness
policies regarding compensation, performance appraisals, and work schedules,
their planning and implementation entail logistical costs.
A fifth inclusion risk concerns accommodation price escalation. Inclusion
requires accommodation policies, for example, parental leave and flexible or
reduced-hour arrangements, which increase administrative and institutional
oversight costs. These infrastructure costs35 2 may rise due to intergroup
competition35 3 and inequality.354
A sixth inclusion risk goes to litigation cost. Inclusion enlarges diversity and,
therefore, increases the probability of employment discrimination suits by
disgruntled entry-level and lateral hires, especially when targeted for harassment
or victimized by retaliation.3 55 Weighed consciously and unconsciously, 35 6
exclusion and inclusion risks contribute to the diversity and discrimination
calculus of Big Law workplaces. Like discrimination itself, that calculus is often
difficult to discern or to fault at least under standard conceptions of law firm
workplace risk management.35 7
4. INTEGRITY AND DIVERSITY
To encourage diversity, equal opportunity, and workplace equity, lawyers and
law firms must recognize and oppose the situational pressures, standard
conventions, and institutionally scripted roles that foster discrimination and
undermine integrity. These environmental constraints often overpower moral
commitments and dissenting voices through the imposition of a stock cost-benefit
352. See generally Gayle White, Diversity in Workplace Causes Rise in Unique Employee Benefits and Changes in
Cafeteria Plans, J. MGMT. & MARKEING REs., May 2009, http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/08082.pdf.
353. See generally Taylor H. Cox et al., Effects of Ethnic Group Cultural Differences on Cooperative and
Competitive Behavior on a Group Task, 34 ACAD. MGMT J. 827 (1991).
354. See generally Frank Linnehan & Alison M. Konrad, Diluting Diversity: Implications for Intergroup
Inequality in Organizations, 8 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 399 (1999), available at http://jmi.sagepub.com/content/8/4/
399.
355. See Jay M. Finkelman, Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation: The Dysfunctional Side of
Diversity, 59 CONSULTING PSYCHOL. J. PRAc. & REs. 254 (2007).
356. On conscious and unconscious bias in employment discrimination, see Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REv. 741 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger &
Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CAuF. L. REv. 997 (2006); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 945 (2006). See also Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010).
357. See Jeffrey C. Connor, It Wasn'tAbout Race. Or Was It?, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 37.
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analysis in determining hiring, promotion, and retention. Opposition to this
routine, makeshift analysis comes, as Luban explains, from an alternative set of
right or reasonable principles that seek value-action harmony in applied contexts,
for example, in connecting diversity norms to hiring practices of workplace
inclusion. For Luban, this practical sense of harmony or equilibrium requires
strategies of line-drawing, counter-intuitive reflection, and chronic skepticism in
cognitive behavior and moral reasoning. In tension with Davis's paradigm of
overriding private self-interest and law firm profitability, the strategies work to
expose contrived ignorance and feigned deniability in the evaluation of
workplace inclusion and exclusion risks.
Workplace assessment of inclusion and exclusion risks in law firms occurs at
both structural and nonstructural levels of management. Structural risk assess-
ment mechanisms include in-house recruitment and mentoring committees.
Nonstructural risk assessment methods include equal opportunity measures that
audit and monitor institutional value compliance. Both forms of regulation influence
the character, culture, and outcomes of law firm hiring, promotion, and retention.
Reshaping law firm character and culture in the interests of diversity will not
occur by denying the inequitable outcomes of profit-motivated, cost-benefit risk
assessments of labor pool composition, social capital accumulation, client
revenue, operational efficiency, human capital accommodation and attrition, or
litigation and settlement cost. Unbounded by design and unchecked by evidence,
such managerial assessments resist principled line-drawing and rely instead on
reflexive intuitive judgments that reinforce historical practices of discrimination
and exclusion in hiring, promotion, and retention. Consider labor pool composi-
tion. Traditionally, profit-oriented managerial risk assessment understates the
benefits and overstates the costs of recruiting a more diverse entry-level and
lateral labor force through pipeline and outreach programs.
Next consider social capital accumulation. Typically, profit-oriented manage-
rial risk assessment overstates the benefits of firm collegiality and social
cohesion, and understates the costs of social capital erosion in bar, bench, and
civic communities due to failed institutional policies of gender diversity and
racial integration.
Moreover, consider client revenue and market share. Conventionally, profit-
oriented managerial risk assessment overstates the benefits of repugnant client
revenue retention, and understates the costs in declining revenue and market
share attributable to a failure to satisfy corporate diversity mandates or client
integration demands.
Additionally, consider operational efficiency. Routinely, profit-oriented mana-
gerial risk assessment overstates the benefits of insular organizational leadership
habits and citizenship rituals, and understates the costs of inadequate mentoring,
monitoring, and information sharing systems and inequitable compensation,
performance appraisal, and work schedule practices.
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Furthermore, consider human capital accommodation and attrition. Customar-
ily, profit-oriented managerial risk assessment overstates the benefits of attrition
and lateral out-migration, even when disaffection-induced, and understates the
costs of deficient accommodation policies (parental leave and flexible or
reduced-hour arrangements), human capital investment in training, and lawyer
replacement.
Finally, consider litigation and settlement costs. Generally, profit-oriented
managerial risk assessment overstates the benefits of litigating or settling
employment discrimination suits brought by discontented entry-level and lateral
hires, and understates the costs of lost business opportunity and industry-wide
reputational harm.
The consistently skewed analysis and inequitable result common to profit-
motivated, cost-benefit risk assessments of workplace inclusion and exclusion
practices among law firms suggest that such intuition-guided, cognitively biased
formulas may be inappropriate or inhospitable to diversity determinations in
hiring, promotion, and retention. Fundamentally, normative commitments to the
values of diversity, equal opportunity, and workplace equity may be ill-suited to
the shifting machinations and trade-offs of cost-benefit analysis. That is not to
say, however, that line-drawing is impossible or unacceptable. Luban reminds us
that line-drawing, along with counter-intuitive reflection and chronic skepticism,
counts among the core principles of professional integrity.
However laudable, Davis's risk management paradigm lacks sufficient norma-
tive substance or procedural reliability to ensure lawyer or law firm compliance
with Luban's integrity principles. To be fair, Davis's paradigm serves useful
cognitive checking, compliance-enforcing, and loss prevention functions. Equally
essential, his paradigm seeks to institutionalize a firm-wide culture of compliance
adapted to the interests of the public, clients, and the spirit of the law. Yet, driven
by the avowed large law firm goals of greater profitability and improved
efficiency, those functions demonstrate a systematic preference for private values
embodied in individual self-interest and institutional advantage displayed, for
example, in Kelley Drye. Rooted in thin ethics rules rather than classical and
diversity norms, that self- or institution-regarding private preference weakens the
regulatory and equitable force of Davis's risk management prescriptions.
For risk management systems to succeed in curbing individual misconduct and.
compensation-fueled institutional pathology, containing adversarial excess, and
diversifying the traditional law firm workplace requires more than risk-mitigating
procedures and protocols. Indeed, they require a culture of compliance, a
commitment to ethics rule conformity, and a willingness to abide by deep
governance norms and to obey the spirit of the law. Davis concedes as much. He
fails to admit, however, that neither culture, nor commitment, nor obedience will
check the excesses of aggressive lawyering or overcome the traditions of
workplace exclusion. The culture of the adversary system, the form and
substance of ethical regulation, and the secular aspiration of the positive law
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permit unchecked aggressive advocacy, possessive self-interest, and de facto
exclusion. That aggressive style of advocacy and discriminatory self-
aggrandizement, an advocacy without clear moral limits, denotes the legal
realism of contemporary civil litigation and law firm governance.
By contrast, classical and diversity norms advance the purposes of legality and
justice, and enhance lawyer accountability for discretionary judgments about
substantive merit and procedural form in advocacy and in law firm governance.
Moreover, they reinforce regulatory norms of professionalism and ground
compliance-enforcing procedures in a deeper culture of internal and external
accountability. Davis's risk management paradigm integrates regulatory norms of
compliance but minimizes discretionary norms of legality and justice, classical
norms of moral aspiration as well as other-regarding interest in law and
community, and diversity norms of equal opportunity and workplace equity. His
paradigmatic commitment to private self-interest and law firm profitability
encourages the dissonance and deniability of contrived ignorance, and the
concomitant loss of lawyer personal and professional integrity. The very same
commitments, coupled with the cultural and social artifacts of inequality and
segregation, generate professional dissonance and deniability about workplace
diversity and discrimination.
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks out the linkages connecting risk governance, litigation and
transactional ethics, and diversity in the large firm legal services industry. In
doing so, it mounts a qualified defense of risk management norms and practices
while integrating the notions of risk deniability and integrity as well as the norms
of classical, discretionary, regulatory, and diversity governance. No doubt fuller
accounts of risk management, tournament competition, and competing classical,
discretionary, regulatory, and diversity norms may better determine the influence
of compliance systems and organizational culture on professional behavior in
large law firms engaged in complex litigation, intricate transactions, and
workplace recruitment. For the moment, it is enough to encourage broader
normative critiques of risk management practices in lawyer regulation and law
firm organization, and to urge wider empirical research in defense of risk
management norms and practices within a more fully elaborated research agenda,
an agenda that looks beyond the self-interest of individual lawyers and law firms
to consider the other-regarding interests of clients, the public, and the law.
. At the same time, it is useful to renew consideration of the professional norms
of integrity undergoing amplification in the literature of philosophy and social
358. See Alfieri, Jim Crow Ethics, supra note 22, at 1670 (discussing adversary principles). See generally
David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in LEGAL Ermcs AND HUMAN DIGNTrY, supra note 22, at 19, 24-28;
David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REV. 468 (1990).
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psychology, especially the work of Luban. This expanding literature offers a
moral response, grounded in law and community, to the rising dominance of
lawyer malpractice, loss prevention, and professional liability norms and
narratives. Those marketplace norms dilute our professional ambitions and
traditions, deform ethical judgment, and inhibit moral integration. The challenge
is not merely to resist the aggressive habits of law firm tournaments, specialized
practice groups, and project teams, but to transform a moral universe that too
often rewards the risk-taking and self-interested behavior of aggressive, non-
inclusive lawyering itself.
